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I. INTRODUCTION
As the amount of wrongful discharge and other types of
employment litigation' have steadily escalated, so has the employer's
*

B.B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; Shareholder, Ryley, Carlock & Applewhite, Phoenix,

Arizona.
1. The courts are not entirely in agreement with respect to when an employment claim is
properly characterized as one for "wrongful discharge." As the California Court of Appeals has
noted:
The opinions in a number of decisions addressing liability for "wrongful discharge" have
evinced some ambivalence, if not confusion, as to the legal basis for recovery, often
discussing in the same case theories of implied contract, violation of public policy and
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. No doubt part of the confusion is
attributable to the undifferentiated use of the term "wrongful discharge." That term is so
broad it is inadequate to distinguish between the possible theories and has on
occasion ... been indiscriminately applied to situations involving only breach of
contract, situations involving a discharge in violation of a fundamental public policy and
situations involving breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Koehrer v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 824 (Ct. App. 1986) (citation omitted). The term is
used in its broad sense in this article because a proper resolution of the discovery issue addressed
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effective cost of terminating an employee.' As a result, the practice of

offering terminated employees severance pay or other benefits in
exchange for their release of potential employment claims has become
increasingly common. 4
While this practice has the salutary effect of reducing litigation over

employment terminations, 5 it creates a potential dilemma for employers.6
The problem stems from the fact that information concerning an
employer's severance agreements is likely to be of interest to other
terminated employees7 who were not offered, or declined to enter into,
here will rarely, if ever, depend upon the precise nature or denomination of the employment claim
being litigated.
2. One court has described the present era as "a time of profuse employment litigation."
Henderson v. City of Murfreesboro, 960 F. Supp. 1292, 1298-99 (M.D. Tenn. 1997); see also Malik
v. Carrier Corp., 986 F. Supp. 86, 91 (D. Conn. 1997) (observing that "employment-related claims
represent[] one of the fastest growing areas of litigation across the country"), aff'd in part and rev 'd
in part, 202 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2000); Stefanac v. Cranbrook Educ. Cmty., 458 N.W.2d 56, 87 (Mich.
1990) (Levin, J., dissenting) (referring to "the burgeoning wrongful discharge litigation industry").
3. See Parsons v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., United Techs. Corp., No. 280394, 1996 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 580, at *14 n.3 (Feb. 28, 1996) ("The process of court intervention and decisions
adverse to employers will ultimately raise the cost to the employer of discharging...
employees .... " (quoting Robert Brand Gidding, Comment, Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.:
Is the Public Policy Exception to the At Will Doctrine a Bad Omen for the Employment
Relationship?, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 1187, 1196 (1980))); Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 381 S.E.2d
445, 452 (N.C. 1989) (Meyer, J., dissenting) ("Costs are involved in documenting just cause for
termination and in producing evidence that an at-will employee was not terminated for a particular
improper reason.").
4. See Local Union No. 1992, IBEW v. Okonite Co., 189 F.3d 339, 348 (3d Cir. 1999)
(Rosenn, J., dissenting) ("The requirement that employees sign a release as a condition of receiving
severance pay is a common provision in modem severance agreements."); Cassino v. Reichhold
Chems., Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1342 (9th Cir. 1987) (describing the scenario in which "an
employment relationship is terminated and the employer offers a contemporaneous severance pay
package in exchange for a release of ail potential claims"); Stefanac, 458 N.W.2d at 72 (Levin, J.,
dissenting) ("It has become common for employers to use the exit interview as a means of obtaining
a 'rush release' by offering a discharged employee separation or severance pay on a take-it-orleave-it basis.").
5. See Young v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., II F. Supp. 2d 921, 926 (S.D. Tex. 1998)
("Courts ... encourage the use[] of settlement and release as a means of resolving employment
disputes.").
6. Among other things, the practice may create an undesired incentive for employees to
assert, or at least threaten to assert, wrongful discharge claims. See Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting the
Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 955, 999 (1988) (noting that settling
with one potential adversary may encourage others "to file new claims"). See generally Tyler v.
Comer Constr. Corp., 167 F.3d 1202, 1206 (8th Cir. 1999) (discussing the desire of parties
considering settlement "not to create a market in complaints"); 2 BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1932 (Paul W. Crane et al. eds., 3d ed. 1996)
(noting that "employers ... wish to discourage the filing of claims by others").
7. This interest is implicit in Congress's enactment of the Older Workers Benefit Protection
Act ("OWBPA"). Pub. L. No. 10 1-433, 104 Stat. 978, 983 § 201 (1990) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 626(f)(l)(H) (1994)). The OWBPA effectively requires that employees being offered
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similar agreements,8 but instead chose to challenge the lawfulness of
their terminations in court.9
For a variety of reasons, '° employers are likely to have a
countervailing interest in keeping their severance agreements
confidential." As a result of these conflicting interests,' 2 a severance
agreement intended to avoid litigation over an employee's termination
may result in alternative litigation over its discoverability in cases

severance benefits in exchange for the release of federal age discrimination claims as part of "an
exit incentive or other employment termination program offered to a group or class of employees"
be given "preliminary discovery as to the impact of the program on older workers." 2 LINDEMANN
& GROSSMAN, supra note 6,at 1925-26. In particular, the employer must provide such employees
with written notice of the following information:
(i) any class, unit, or group of individuals covered by such program, any eligibility
factors for such program, and any time limits applicable to such program; and
(ii) the job titles and ages of all individuals eligible or selected for the program, and the
ages of all individuals in the same job classification or organizational unit who are not
eligible or selected for the program.
29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(l)(H).
8. See, e.g., Holley v. Pansophic Sys. Inc., No. 90 C 7505, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13910, at
*23 (N.D. I11.
Sept. 30, 1993) (describing a terminated employee who was seeking to "use [other
employees'] severance agreements as evidence that [she] received less favorable treatment upon her
termination").
9. One commentator recently illustrated the employer's dilemma with the following
example:
Consider a hypothetical sex discrimination [claim asserted] by an employee alleging
hostile work environment. ... [T]he employer drafts a settlement agreement that
includes a confidentiality clause prohibiting disclosure of both the nature of the
[employee's] charge and the terms of the settlement agreement. The problem arises
when, after settlement, a third party ....[such as] the plaintiff [in] a future sexual
harassment [case], seeks to depose or otherwise obtain information from the original
[employee] regarding the facts underlying the original claim and settlement.
Eric J. Conn, Note, Hanging in the Balance: ConfidentialityClauses and Postjudgment Settlements
of Employment DiscriminationDisputes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1537, 1540 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
10. See generally Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800
F.2d 339, 351 (3d Cir. 1986) (Garth, J., dissenting) ("Parties may have many reasons for desiring
secrecy for the terms of their settlements."). In some instances, an employer's interest in
maintaining the confidentiality of its severance agreements "could stem from a desire not to disclose
[its] bad behavior." Daimes v. Harrison, 838 F. Supp. 1406, 1408 (D. Colo. 1993). However, this
certainly is not always the case. See McHann v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 713 F.2d 161, 166 n.8
(5th Cir. 1983) ("[P]arties settle cases for many reasons and.., settlements are not necessarily
indicative of liability.").
1I. See generally Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. John Labatt Ltd., 888 F. Supp. 1427, 1441
(N.D. II1. 1995) ("[T]he parties to [a settlement] agreement are.likely to have 'a compelling interest
in keeping the settlement amount confidential."') (quoting Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality,
Protective Orders,and PublicAccess to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 485 (1991)).
12. See Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363, 365, 367 (D. Nev. 1993) (discussing the
"direct conflict" between an employer's interest in "protect[ing] ...the secrecy of [its] settlements"
and the desire of other litigants "to obtain discovery ...of the specific terms [of a] settlement
agreement").
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brought by other terminated employees. 3 This possibility undoubtedly

serves to deter some employers from offering their employees severance
pay in exchange for a release,'4 and thus has a detrimental
impact on
7
6
employers, 5 employees,1 and the public in general.1

This article discusses this phenomenon. It begins with a discussion
of the federal evidentiary rules upon which an employer might rely in

attempting to maintain the confidentiality of its severance agreements,' 9
including specifically Rules 40820 and 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.2 ' The article then considers the impact of the liberal discovery

presumptions reflected in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the
confidentiality of severance agreements and other types of settlements.

The article also discusses the effectiveness and impact of including
language in a severance agreement specifically requiring the parties to
13. Cf. Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197, 1200 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (denouncing
settlements that "instead of being an aid to litigation, would be... productive of litigation as a
separate and additional impetus" (quoting Melnick v. Binenstock, 179 A. 77, 78 (Pa. 1935)));
Stefanac v. Cranbrook Educ. Cmty., 458 N.W.2d 56, 66 (Mich. 1990) (referring to another situation
in which "the very instrument that is intended to insure forbearance of litigation itself fosters a
separate layer of litigation").
14. See Centillion Data Sys., Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 193 F.R.D. 550, 553 (S.D. Ind. 1999)
(observing that "confidentiality of settlement agreements is a primary inducement to parties to settle
cases"); Daines, 838 F. Supp. at 1408 ("Everyone agrees that confidentiality furthers settlement.").
15. See Kesselring v. United Techs. Corp., 753 F. Supp. 1359, 1366 (S.D. Ohio 1991) ("It is
to be expected that an employer would want to avoid litigation concerning its employment
decisions .... ); Sablosky v. Edward S. Gordon Co., 526 N.Y.S.2d 820, 822 (App. Div. 1988) ("It
[is in] the employer's interest to avoid litigation whenever possible and to confer some benefit upon
itself and its employees .. "), rev'd, 535 N.E.2d 643 (N.Y. 1989).
16. See Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 403 (6th Cir. 1998) (noting that
"disincentives for employers to offer benefits" are "not in the interests of employees generally");
Borne v. A & P Boat Rentals No. 4, Inc., 780 F.2d 1254, 1257 (5th Cir. 1986) (observing that
denying employees the option to settle an employment dispute by eliminating the employer's
incentive for doing so is "no kindness").
17. See Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1177
(C.D. Cal. 1998) ("[Clonsensual dispute resolution serves the public good by fostering conciliatory
relationships between employees and employers .... ), affd, 216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000). But
see Brazil, supra note 6, at 990 ("Parties to settlement negotiations ... are by definition adversaries.
While in a small percentage of cases they may end up with ongoing relationships, society usually
has no independent interest in nurturing close ties between adverse litigants .... ").
18. There is not an abundance of case law addressing the discoverability of severance and
other types of settlement agreements. See Vardon Golf Co. v. BBMG Golf Ltd., 156 F.R.D. 641,
650 (N.D. Ill. 1994) ("This question has received surprisingly little treatment in the published
opinions.").
19. See Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1171 ("The existing Federal Rules provide an important
backdrop against which to view the role of a ... privilege in protecting confidentiality and trust
between disputants.") (citing, inter alia, FED. R. EvID. 408).
20. FED. R. EvID. 408.
21. FED.R.EVID.501.
22. See infra Part II.C.
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maintain the confidentiality of the agreement.23 The article ultimately
concludes that despite the existence of strong policy arguments in favor
of protecting severance agreements from discovery, an employer
contemplating the use of a severance agreement cannot be confident
that
4
it will be able to preserve the confidentiality of the agreement.1
Before proceeding, a word of caution is in order. 2' There is
authority for the contention that Rule 408, which provides at least some
degree of confidentiality protection to settlement evidence,26 should not
apply to an employer's offer of severance pay in exchange for an
employee's release of potential claims.27 The rationale for this view
appears to be that no dispute has yet arisen in that situation," and "Rule
408, on its face, is limited to actual disputes over existing claims,"29 or
"at least an apparent difference of opinion between the parties."30
However, this is a questionable interpretation of the rule,3 and other
courts have declined to embrace it,32 particularly where the employee
accepted the severance offer.33 In any event, a detailed analysis of this
issue is beyond the scope of the present article,34 which assumes (not
23. See infra Part I.D.
24. See infra Part lI.
25. See Brazil, supra note 6, at 961 ("Counsel must beware of the possibility of narrow
judicial views of when a claim is 'disputed' for purposes of [Rule 408].").
26. See infra Part II.A.
27. See Cassino v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1987).
28. See Haun v. Ideal Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d 541, 547 (5th Cir. 1996) ("In Cassino, the
employer asked the employee to sign a release when he was fired. The Ninth Circuit held that there
was no dispute between the parties at the time of the firing, so the release did not fall within Rule
408."); Mundy v. Household Fin. Corp., 885 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1989).
In Cassino ... we held that [Rule] 408 only applies to settlement offers made after
termination, where the employee has asserted that he or she is the victim of illegal
discrimination. Severance pay packages contingent upon a release of claims which are
offered contemporaneously with the notice of termination are not covered by the
rule ....
Id. at 546 (citations omitted).
29. Deere & Co. v. Int'l Harvester Co., 710 F.2d 1551, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
30. Dallis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 768 F.2d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 1985).
31. See Kirkpatrick v. Gen. Elec., 963 F. Supp. 628, 634 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (noting the
"difference of opinion on this issue"); Brazil, supra note 6, at 965 (stating that Cassino and other
similar cases have "construe[d] rule 408 in ways that tend to defeat its purposes"); Alpex Computer
Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 770 F. Supp. 161, 164 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("[S]everal commentators have
criticized the use of ... a strict, objective standard for measuring when a dispute begins for Rule
408 purposes.") (citing, interalia, Brazil, supra).
32. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick, 963 F. Supp. at 634 ("This court.., is not inclined to follow the
Cassino case."); cf. Haun, 81 F.3d at 547 n.3 ("[T]here is doubt about the continuing precedential
value of Cassino .... ).
33. See Stroman v. W. Coast Grocery Co., 884 F.2d 458, 462 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
that the analysis in Cassino was irrelevant in a case involving a "validly executed" release),
34. For a prior academic discussion of the issue, see Brazil, supra note 6, at 960-66.
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illogically, it is submitted)35 that a terminated employee's release of
claims in exchange for severance benefits ordinarily resolves a dispute
between the employee and the employer concerning the propriety of the
employee's termination.

II.

POTENTIAL BASES FOR PRECLUDING THE DISCLOSURE OF
SEVERANCE AGREEMENTS

A. Protectingthe Confidentiality of Severance Agreements
Under Rule 408
Although it specifically addresses the admissibility of evidence at
trial rather than the scope of discovery," Rule 408 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence38 provides a logical starting point in analyzing the
confidentiality of severance agreements involving the release of
employment claims.3 9 The rule states, in pertinent part, as follows:
35. See Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank, 928 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1990).
In discharge cases, the adverse nature of the act is inherent and obvious. Termination of
employment communicates to a discharged employee that he is being treated differently
from other employees, for he or she realizes that other co-workers have been retained
and he or she has not. Termination prompts immediate inquiry into the employer's
rationale for taking such adverse action.
Id. at 92 (Sprouse, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
36. See, e.g., Wynne v. P.C. Greenville Ltd. P'ship, No. 4:97-CV-89-BO(3), 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21828, at *4-*5 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 10, 1997) (finding that the severance pay an employee
received in exchange for her release of claims "represented a settlement on a disputed claim");
Conery v. Bath Assocs., 803 F. Supp. 1388, 1401 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (describing an employer that
"entered in [a] severance agreement to avoid potential litigation concerning the basis for [an
employee's] severance"); ..... ; see also Alpex Computer Corp., 770 F. Supp. at 164 (indicating that
"the existence of [a] dispute or a difference of opinion sufficient to meet the threshold requirement
of Rule 408" can be "implied").
37. See Shipes v. BIC Corp., 154 F.R.D. 301, 309 (M.D. Ga. 1994) (observing that "Rule 408
deals only with admissibility at trial and not the scope of discovery"); Servants of Paraclete, Inc. v.
Great Am. Ins. Co., 866 F. Supp. 1560, 1576 (D.N.M. 1994) ("Federal Rule of Evidence 408 does
not bar discovery of settlement negotiations or amounts.").
38. FED. R. EVID. 408. Rule 408 governs "the admissibility of evidence of compromise offers
or agreements in federal trials." Mclnnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 247 (lst Cir. 1985).
However, most states have comparable rules that presumably would lead to similar results in state
court litigation. See generally Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Color Converting Indus. Co., 45 F.3d
1170, 1177 (7th Cir. 1995) (referring to "Fed. R. Evid. 408 and its state counterparts"); Davidson v.
Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1233 n.9 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (discussing "Federal Rule of Evidence 408
and similar state rules").
39. See Brazil, supra note 6, at 987-88 ("Whether or not communications made during
settlement negotiations are discoverable may depend, in part, on whether courts will recognize a
'privilege' for settlement communications under rule 408 .... ). See generally Smith v. B & 0
R.R. Co., 473 F. Supp. 572, 585 (D. Md. 1979) ("Courts have generally held that the law of
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Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2)
accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration
in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was
disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove
liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of
conduct of statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not
admissible.

40

Despite its focus on admissibility, Rule 408 was applied to preclude
discovery pertaining to the settlement of an employment claim in

Kalinauskas v. Wong. n1 In Kalinauskas, an individual alleging unlawful
sex discrimination sought to depose another former employee who had
previously filed a sexual harassment action against the same employer.42
The potential deponent had settled her claim prior to trial and signed a
confidential settlement agreement that the court then sealed at the
request of the parties4 3

evidence governing the actual trial also determines whether something is 'privileged' for purposes
of discovery. Thus, information which would be inadmissible at trial because of an evidentiary
privilege, would not be available in the course of discovery.") (citations omitted).
40. FED. R. EvID. 408.
41. 151 F.R.D. 363, 365 (D. Nev. 1993). Kalinauskas and a number of the other cases
discussed in this article address the discoverability of agreements to settle claims asserted in
litigation, rather than prelitigation "severance" agreements. However, subject to the caveat
previously discussed, supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text, the analysis under Rule 408 is
generally the same in both situations. See Alpex Computer Corp., 770 F. Supp. at 164 ("[Llitigation
need not have actually commenced for Rule 408 to apply."); Ferguson v. FDIC, No. 3:91-CV-2492D, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16546, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 1.997) (noting that "Rule 408 is not
limited to settlement negotiations that commence after a lawsuit is filed"). Indeed, "one of the
principal purposes of the rule [is] to encourage parties to settle their disagreements outside the court
system." Brazil, supra note 6, at 963 (emphasis added); cf Reichenbach v. Smith, 528 F.2d 1072,
1074 (5th Cir. 1976) ("A primary reason for excluding evidence of a compromise is to encourage
non-litigious solutions to disputes.").
42. See Kalinauskas, 151 F.R.D. at 365. Sexual harassment is, of course, a form of unlawful
sex discrimination. See Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1191 (9th Cir. 2001).
43. See Kalinauskas, 151 F.R.D. at 365. Requesting that an agreement settling litigation be
"sealed" is a common means of attempting to maintain its confidentiality. See Bank of Am. Nat'l
Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 351 (3d Cir. 1986) (Garth, J.,
dissenting) (speculating that "many trial judges regard it as self-evident that secrecy is often
necessary and they therefore order settlement agreements filed under seal as a matter of course").
However, this strategy is unavailable to employers seeking to maintain the confidentiality of
prelitigation severance agreements, and it is by no means foolproof in any event. See ABF Capital
Mgmt. v. Askin Capital Mgmt., Nos. 96 Civ. 2978 (RWS) et al., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3633, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2000) (observing that "litigants cannot shield a settlement agreement from
discovery merely because it ... was filed under seal"); Brazil, supra note 6, at 956-57 ("Although
placing a settlement under seal pursuant to a court order may be useful in some circumstances,
counsel cannot be confident that this procedure assures protection of the settlement's
confidentiality.").
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The Kalinauskas court acknowledged that the scope of discovery is
ordinarily very broad," and indicated that Sthe4' deponent could be
examined about her own employment experiences and any knowledge
she might have concerning sexual harassment by the employer.46
However, the court cited Rule 40847 in concluding that the public interest
should protect "the secrecy of settlement when desired by the settling
parties." 8 Observing that permitting discovery into all aspects of the
deponent's case might discourage similar settlements, 9 the court held
that her deposition and any additional discovery into her case could not
address the substantive terms of her settlement. 0
In reaching this result, the court relied on the analysis in Flynn v.
Portland General Electric Corp.,"1 an earlier federal court decision in
which the plaintiffs in an age discrimination case sought discovery of
information pertaining to the settlement of another former employee's
claim against the same employer. 2 As part of that settlement, the
employee with respect to whom discovery was being sought had agreed
to maintain the confidentiality of all information concerning the case,
including the terms of the settlement.53 Without specifically discussing
Rule 408,, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to

44. See Kalinauskas, 151 F.R.D. at 365; see also Mitchell v. Hutchings, 116 F.R.D. 481, 483
(D. Utah 1987) ("Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, discovery in civil cases is generally
broad.").
45. See Kalinauskas, 151 F.R.D. at 367. Employers are occasionally successful in prohibiting
even this type of discovery on the ground that the deponent did not work in the "employing unit or
work unit from which came the decision of which the [plaintiff] complains." EEOC v. Packard Elec.
Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 569 F.2d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1978).
46. See Kalinauskas, 151 F.R.D. at 367. The court stated that the employer could not "conceal
basic facts of concern to [the plaintiff] in her case, and of legitimate concern, regarding employment
at its place of business." Id.; see also Wendt v. Walden Univ., 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA).
1542, 1543 (D. Minn. 1996) ("[Iln employment discrimination cases, the testimony of co-workers is
often the most probative of evidence. The evidence is often not just relevant, but indispensable.").
47. See Kalinauskas, 151 F.R.D. at 365 ("See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 408 which protects
compromises and offers to compromise by rendering them inadmissible to prove liability.").
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 367.
51. 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1497 (D. Or. 1989).
52. See id. at 1497.
53. See id.
54. Settlement evidence has some degree of common law protection independent of Rule 408
itself. See Kolson v. Vembu, 869 F. Supp. 1315, 1333 (N.D. Il.1994) (observing that Rule 408 "is
the well-known embodiment, plus an extension, of the common law rule that sought to encourage
the settlement of disputes"); see also Derderian v. Polaroid Corp., 121 F.R.D. 9, 11 (D. Mass. 1988)
(stating that "Rule 408... was specifically drafted with the intent of expanding the 'common law
rule').
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discover the confidential settlement information they were seeking.5
56 the Flynn
Foreshadowing the analysis later adopted in Kalinauskas,
court concluded that the public policy favoring the voluntary resolution
of disputes dictates that agreements to keep settlements confidential not
be lightly abrogated.57
Despite the analysis in Kalinauskas and Flynn, Rule 408 does not
provide a reliable basis for concluding that severance agreements are
privileged from disclosure in discovery." Both Kalinauskas and Flynn
were cited with approval in Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Housing
Services,'9 a case discussed later in this article6 ° in which another court
relied •in part
upon Rule 408 in precluding the discovery of settlement
61
evidence.
However,
both cases were also discussed in Wendt v. Walden
• • 62
University, a case that arguably reached a different result.63
In Wendt, the plaintiff in a sexual harassment case sought to depose
two of her former coworkers who had ceased working for the defendant
employer after executing severance agreements that contained
confidentiality provisions.' The employer sought to prevent the
coworkers, who had also allegedly been subjected to harassment or some
65 from being deposed
other form of discrimination,
concerning any
66
severances.
their
of
aspect
While acknowledging that confidential settlements may benefit
67
society, the court held that the employer had not shown the "good
cause" necessary to preclude the coworkers' depositions68 under Rule
26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 69The court concluded that
55. See Flynn, 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1498.
56. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
57. See Flynn, 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1498; see also In re N.Y. County Data
Entry Worker Prod. Liab. Litig., 616 N.Y.S.2d 424, 428 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (citing Flynn).
58. One court has specifically stated that "the argument that a 'settlement negotiation'
privilege is authorized under [Rule] 408 is ... misplaced." Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Dep't of Justice,
576 F. Supp. 739, 749 (D.D.C. 1983).
59. 187 F.R.D. 453, aff'd, 190 F.R.D. 42 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
60. See infra notes 347-68 and accompanying text.
61. See Hasbrouck, 187 F.R.D. at 456, 458-59, 461-62.
62. 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1542 (D. Minn. 1996).
63. In fact, the Wendt court specifically distinguished Flynn. See id. at 1543.
64. See id. at 1542.
65. See id. at 1543.
66. See id. at 1542.
67. See Wendt, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1543; cf. In re N.Y. County Data Entry
Worker Prod. Liab. Litig., 616 N.Y.S.2d 424, 427 (Sup. Ct. 1994) ("[T]here is a societal benefit in
recognizing the autonomy of parties to shape their own solution to a controversy rather than having
one judicially imposed.").
68. See Wendt, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1543.
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Under Rule 26(c), the court, upon a showing of good cause, may
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while the coworkers were free to contract with the employer as they saw
fit,70 their agreements should not prohibit the plaintiff, who was not a
party to the agreements, from pursuing discovery in support of her own
case.7 A contrary result, the court explained, would effectively permit
employers to use settlements to silence their employees when the facts
of one employment dispute could be relevant to another.72
It is not clear precisely how broadly the decision in Wendt should
be read. The court in that case did not discuss Rule 408, apparently
because the plaintiff was seeking to discover the facts underlying the
deponents' separation from employment,73 rather than the specific terms
of their severance agreements. 74 The rule by its terms does not apply to
evidence that is otherwise discoverable merely because it is the subject
of settlement negotiations.
Thus, Wendt has been cited for the unremarkable proposition that
"the public interest is better served by permitting discovery of facts
about similar claims against a party in a discrimination suit despite
the ... agreement of litigants not to disclose such information. 76 In this
respect, the court's decision to permit the requested discovery is
undoubtedly correct, 7 but would not preclude reliance on Rule 408 to
issue an order "protect[ing] a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense." Id. The Wendt court cited this rule in stating that the employer, "as the party
seeking a protective order, [bore] the burden of making the 'good cause' showing ... that it [would]
be harmed." Wendt, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1543; see also Lesal Interiors, Inc. v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 153 F.R.D. 552, 561 (D.N.J. 1994) ("Where the material sought is relevant,
the burden is on the party seeking nondisclosure or a protective order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c) to
show good cause for nondisclosure.").
70. See Wendt, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1543; cf. White v. Kenneth Warren & Son,
Ltd., 203 F.R.D. 364, 368 (N.D. I11.2001) (recognizing "the right of private parties to contract for
confidential settlement terms").
71. See Wendt, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1543; see also Long v. Am. Red Cross, 145
F.R.D. 658, 667 (S.D. Ohio 1993) ("[l~t is generally held that private agreements to keep
information confidential are not enforceable against third parties if the information agreed to be kept
confidential is not deserving of protection in the absence of a confidentiality agreement.").
72. See Wendt, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1543 (citing Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151
F.R.D. 363, 365 (D. Nev. 1993)).
73. See id.
74. See ESPN, Inc. v. Office of Comm'r of Baseball, 76 F. Supp. 2d 383, 410 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) ("There is no bright-line rule governing whether evidence constitutes settlement material for
purposes of [Rule] 408.").
75. See FED. R. EvID. 408 ("This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations.").
76. McKnight v. Stein Mart, Inc., No. 95-0258 Sec. "1"(2), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12581, at
*4 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 1996) (emphasis added).
77. See Amalgamated Bank of N.Y. v. Pa. Cos., No. 93-6703, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10147,
at *5 n.3 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 1995) ("Rule 408 does not preclude the discovery of a piece of evidence
simply because it is presented during settlement negotiations. The Rule bars evidence of conduct
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prohibit the discovery of actual settlement evidence in cases such as
Kalinauskas.
This conclusion is suggested by a recent Kansas state court decision
in a similar case, Farmers Group, Inc. v. Lee.7 9 In Lee, an employee
signed a severance agreement resolving a discrimination claim he had
asserted against the employer.80 The agreement prohibited the employee
from disclosing not only the terms of the agreement, but also his
knowledge of any alleged discrimination by the employer against other
employees. 8 A group of individuals subsequently sought to call the
employee as a witness in their own case against the employer.82
The employer argued that the employee should be enjoined from
testifying in that action, 83 and that such an injunction would not violate
the state's public policy.'4
The Kansas Court of Appeals sustained the lower court's
recognition that a trial court may not lawfully enjoin the employee from
participating in the litigation of third-party claims against the employer.85
The court stated:
The problem is that.., the injunction under scrutiny here purported to
prevent [the employee] from disseminating even nonconfidential,
truthful information when called upon to do so in connection with a
claim against his former employer .... Permitting employers to silence

former employees in such a manner ultimately undermines not only

which occurred during the settlement session as opposed to evidence of past conduct which was
presented during negotiations."); Bottaro v. Hatton Assocs., 96 F.R.D. 158, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
("Rule 408 [does] not immunize documents or factual admissions merely because they were
exchanged in the course of negotiating a settlement ....); United States v. Reserve Mining Co.,
412 F. Supp. 705, 712 (D. Minn.) (stating that any "privilege surrounding offers of compromise"
does not "shield otherwise discoverable documents, merely because these documents represent
factual matters that might be or are incorporated in a settlement proposal"), aff'd and remanded, 543
F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976).
78. In fact, Wendt was discussed without criticism in Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Hous.
Servs., 187 F.R.D. 453, 456, 459, 462, aff'd, 190 F.R.D. 42 (N.D.N.Y. 1999), where the court cited
both Rule 408 and Kalinauskas in support of its decision to prohibit the discovery of confidential
settlement evidence. See id. at 456, 458-59, 461-62.
79. 28 P.3d 413 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001).
80. See id. at 415.
81. See id. at 415-16.
82. See id. at 416.
83. More specifically, the employer argued that the trial court had erred in modifying a prior
injunction to permit the employee to testify. See id.
84. See Lee, 28 P.3d at 417.
85. See id. at 419-20.
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individual third-party plaintiffs' abilities to vindicate their rights but

the judicial system itself.86
However, noting that a former employee can be enjoined from
disclosing confidential information, the court permitted the employee
to testify only about company olierating procedures that were not88
covered by the severance agreement's confidentiality provision.
The court left intact the portion of the injunction prohibiting the
employee from participating in "any other conduct or communication"
that would violate the agreement," including, presumably, the provision
in

which he agreed

"not

[to] disclose and ... to maintain in

confidence... the terms of [the] Agreement."9
In Scott v. Nelson,9' another state appellate court specifically relied
on Wendt in permitting limited discovery in a similar context. 9 In Scott,
the defendant's settlement of a prior claim against him was
memorialized in an agreement that prohibited the claimant from
responding to any inquiries concerning the facts that gave rise to the
claim. 93 When the plaintiffs in a subsequent case attempted to depose the
claimant, the defendant sought to prevent the deposition on the ground
that permitting the claimant to testify "would ...deprive him of the
protections for which he bargained in the settlement." 94
The court acknowledged that the strong public policy favoring the
settlement of disputes dictates that such confidentiality agreements not
be lightly disregarded. 9'5 Nevertheless, the court held that the agreement
could not preclude the plaintiffs from discovering
potentially relevant
• 96
evidence in support of their own claims. However, in refusing "to
prevent any discovery based upon [the] settlement agreement, ' 97 the
court emphasized that the plaintiffs were "not seeking information about
the terms of the settlement agreement," but instead were merely seeking

86. Id.
87. See id. at 419 (citing Koch Eng'g Co. v. Faulconer, 610 P.2d 1094 (Kan. 1980)).
88. See id. at 420 (stating that the employee could "testify about only those ordinary operating
procedures that are not covered by the agreement or the injunction, i.e., nonconfidential ordinary
operating procedures").
89. Lee, 28 P.3d at 416.
90. Id.
91.
92.

697 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
See id. at 1300-01.

93. See id. at 1300.
94. Id.
95.

Seeid. at 1301.

96. See Nelson, 697 So. 2d at 1300-01.
97. Id. at 1301 (emphasis added).
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to discover potentially relevant "factual information" about the claim
that had been settled.9"
This analysis is consistent with the Wendt court's own observation
that requiring a party to disclose the terms of a settlement is
"emphatically different" from permitting discovery into the facts that
gave rise to the settled dispute.99 Thus, at least one commentator has also
relied on Wendt in asserting that courts considering the discoverability
of settlement evidence should "distinguish between the facts concerning
the settlement itself and evidentiary information relevant to the
underlying merits. ' °
However, Wendt has also been cited in support of the proposition
that Rule 408 does not create a settlement "privilege" for discovery
purposes,'0 ' and several courts have reached the same conclusion without
specifically relying upon Wendt.' °2 Thus, while there is academic,' 3
legislative' and judicial support for the view that Rule 408 should be
interpreted as a form of privilege,' 5 an employer seeking to maintain the

98. Id.
99. Wendt v. Walden Univ., 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1542, 1543 (D. Minn. 1996).
100. Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy By Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the
Pursuitof Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 283, 399 & n.452 (1999).
101. Gutter v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 95-2152-CIV-GOLD, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9706, at **3, 6 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2001); see also Channelmark Corp. v. Destination Prods.
July 7, 2000) (citing
Int'l, Inc., No. 99 C 214, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9854, at **3, 13 (N.D. I11.
Wendt while observing that Rule 408 "only applies to the admissibility of evidence at trial and does
not necessarily protect such evidence from discovery" (quoting Morse/Diesel Inc. v. Fid. & Deposit
Co., 122 F.R.D. 447,449 (1988), modified in part, 768 F. Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1991))).
102. See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 723
F.2d 238, 275 (3d Cir. 1983) (observing that "Rule 408 is not a privilege"), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); NAACP v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, 612 F. Supp. 1143, 1146 (D.D.C. 1985) (stating that Rule 408 "was never intended
to be a broad discovery privilege").
103. See, e.g., Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 770 F. Supp. 161, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
("Weinstein and Berger contend that Rule 408 should be treated as a species of privilege... "
(citing 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 408[21, at 40820 (1990))); Brazil, supra note 6, at 990 ("A strong argument in favor of viewing rule 408 as
creating a privilege can be built from the principal purpose of the rule.").
104. See Kennon v. Slipstreamer, Inc., 794 F.2d 1067, 1075 n.l (5th Cir. 1986) (Thomberry, J.,
dissenting) (observing that "the Senate Judiciary Committee apparently viewed the Rule as resting
solely on [a] privilege rationale" (citing S. REP. No. 93-1277 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7056)).
105. See, e.g., Small v. Hunt, 152 F.R.D. 509, 511 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (assuming, without
deciding, that there is a "privilege delineated in Rule 408"); Prod. Credit Ass'n of Midlands v.
Ryan, 441 N.W.2d 379, 385 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989) (Sackett, J., dissenting) ("Rule 408 is akin to a
privilege rather than a rule of competency."); cf. Coulter, Inc. v. Allen, 624 P.2d 1199, 1202 (Wyo.
1981) (relying on the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 408 in holding that a state counterpart to
the rule "is in the nature of a privilege").
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confidentiality of its severance agreements cannot safely assume that
Rule 408 will be applied in that fashion.' °
B. Protecting Confidentiality Under Rule 501
Although Rule 408 itself may be insufficient for the purpose,' °7
additional support for the recognition of a settlement privilege might be
found in Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 0 8 The latter rule
states, in pertinent part, that evidentiary privileges are "governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of
the United States in the light of reason and experience. '"'0° It thus
authorizes the federal courts to develop such privileges on a case-bycase basis.' 0
An evidentiary privilege authorizes its holder to refuse to disclose
otherwise relevant evidence and also to prevent others from revealing
protected communications."' Thus, Rule 501 is not limited to the
admissibility of evidence, but permits courts to protect confidential
communications from discovery where doing so would serve broad
societal objectives."' Rule 501 thus may supplement the argument
available under Rule 408"' for precluding the discovery of information
severance agreements, as well as other types
pertaining to an employer's
1
14
evidence.
of settlement
106. See Multi-Tech Sys., Inc. v. Dialpad.com, Inc., No. 00-1540 ADM/RLE, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 309, at *5 (D.Minn. Jan. 8, 2000) (discussing criticism of the view that Rule 408
"established a semi-privilege [applicable] to confidential settlement agreements and negotiations");
Brazil, supra note 6, at 957 ("[Diespite the policy that inspires rule 408, there are many
").
circumstances in which ... settlement negotiations will not be protected from disclosure ....
107. See Brazil, supra note 6,at 966 (observing that parties "must look to some device other
than rule 408 to protect the confidentiality of what they say during negotiations").
108. FED. R. EvID. 501.
109. Id.
110. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980).
111. See Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1120 n.15 (N.D. Cal. 1999); see
also Trinity Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Holum, 544 N.W.2d 148, 156 (N.D. 1996) ("Privilege addresses a
person's right not to have another testify as to certain matters as part of a judicial process ....
(quoting Susan 0. Scheutzow & Sylvia Lynn Gillis, Confidentiality and Privilege of Peer Review

Information: More Imagined Than Real, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 169, 192 (1992-1993))).
112. See Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 458 (N.D. Cal. 1978); cf.
Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 357, 362 ("Federal courts are ... guided on the issue
), vacated on other grounds by, 167
of discoverability of privileged material by Rule 501.

F.R.D. 6 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
113.
114.

See supra Part II.A.
See generally Sheldone v. Pa. Tpk. Comm'n, 104 F. Supp. 2d 511, 512 (W.D. Pa. 2000)
("[A party] correctly identifies Federal Rule of Evidence 501 as authority for the creation of
evidentiary privileges under the federal common law.").
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In Sheldone v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission,"' for example,
the court relied on Rule 501 in adopting a federal "mediation"

privilege 16 that prohibits the discovery of communications made in
connection with or during settlement negotiations conducted before a

neutral mediator. "7 The court cited Rule 408 ' 18 in asserting that its
recognition of this privilege was supported by "the well established
public needs of encouraging settlement and reducing court dockets. '1 9
This observation, coupled with the fact that mediation is merely a

specialized form of settlement negotiation,"O suggests that Rule 501 may
also support the recognition of a broader privilege applicable to
settlements negotiated outside the context of a formal mediation
process.121
In Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,122for example, the court

123
held that employee communications with a company ombudsman

115. 104 F. Supp. 2d 511 (W.D. Pa. 2000).
116. See id. at 512-16. The judicial recognition of such a privilege is a relatively recent
development. Speaking just two years before Sheldone was decided, another court noted that "[n]o
federal court [had] definitively adopted a mediation privilege as federal common law under Rule
501." Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1171 (C.D. Cal.
1998), aff'd, 216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Lynne H. Rambo, Impeaching Lying Parties
With Their Statements During Negotiation: Demysticizing the Public Policy Rationale Behind
Evidence Rule 408 and the Mediation- Privilege, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1037, 1063 (2000) ("Mediation
privileges ... are almost all of very recent vintage.").
117. See Sheldone, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 517; see also In re Anonymous, 283 F.3d 627, 639 n.16
(4th Cir. 2002) ("[A]. federal mediation privilege would.., preclude the disclosure of any
document, discussion, or statement made during mediation."). For a recent academic discussion of
this privilege, see Christopher DeMayo, Comment, The Mediation Privilege and Its Limits, 5 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 383 (2000).
118. SeeSheldone,.104F. Supp. 2dat515, 517.
119. Id. at 514; see also Astor Holdings, Inc. v. Roski, No. 01 Civ. 1905 (GEL), 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 758, at *32 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2002) ("[O]ne of the purposes for the mediation
privilege is to encourage settlement .... ).
120. See Rambo, supra note 116, at 1058 (observing that "mediations are but one form of
compromise negotiations"). One court has noted that both mediation and "private party settlement"
involve "collective consideration of the facts favoring each party, discussion of the issues, armslength negotiation and compromise." Hanley v. Mazda Motor Corp., 609 N.W.2d 203, 208 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2000); see also Vernon v. Acton, 732 N.E.2d 805, 808-09 (Ind. 2000) ("Mediation shall be
regarded as settlement negotiations as governed by . .. Rule 408.").
121. See Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1174 ("[S]everal ... district court decisions.., hold that
settlement communications between parties should be privileged in one fashion or another, whether
the information was communicated in the course of a formal mediation with a neutral or simply in
private settlement negotiations between the parties."); cf. Smith v. Smith, 154 F.R.D. 661, 673 n.16
(N.D. Tex. 1994) ("There is ample support for the proposition that the mediation process should be
treated - as are other settlement mechanisms - as confidential.").
122. 133 F.R.D. 570 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
123. In this context, "the term 'ombudsman' refers to an employee outside the corporate chain
of command whose job is to investigate and mediate workplace disputes." Carman v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790, 792-93 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Solorzano v. Shell Chem. Co., 83

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

15

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 1
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

(Vol. 20:1

made for the purpose of resolving employment disputes "informally and

more quickly than other more formal [settlement] procedures"1 2 4 were
protected from disclosure under Rule 501.25 Although Kientzy did not

involve actual settlement negotiations between the employer and the
27
employee,'26 the ombudsman's potential role in obtaining28 a settlement
provided the essential backdrop for the court's decision.

The plaintiff in Kientzy asserted a sex discrimination claim against
her former employer after her employment was terminated. 29 She then
sought to depose the employer's ombudsman.' 3 The plaintiff argued that

the discovery of information obtained from other employees during the
ombudsman's prior investigation of the plaintiffs internal complaint
might reveal the existence of a discriminatory motive underlying the

decision to terminate her.'3'
The court observed that the purpose of the ombudsman position
was "to mediate, in a strictly confidential environment, disputes...
between employees and management.'1 2 Noting that Congress in
enacting Rule 408 recognized the value of such efforts,'33 the court stated
that "[t]he utility of [the ombudsman's] program and office, in resolving
disputes in this workplace and thus diminishing the need for more
formal resolution procedures, is founded on the confidentiality of its

Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1481, 1486 n.2 (E.D. La. 2000) (quoting Carman).
124. Kientzy, 133 F.R.D. at 572.
125. See id. at 57 1. For academic discussions of this issue, see generally Brenda V. Thompson,
Comment, Corporate Ombudsmen and Privileged Communications: Should Employee
Communications to Corporate Ombudsmen Be Entitled to Privilege?, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 653
(1992), and Mary Elizabeth McGarry, The Ombudsman Privilege: Keeping Harassment Complaints
Confidential, 214 N.Y. L.J. 1 (1995).
126. The plaintiff apparently sought the ombudsman's assistance in attempting to obtain a
settlement of her employment dispute, but the employer "nevertheless terminated her." Kientzy, 133
F.R.D. at 571.
127. See id. at 572 ("The function of the... ombudsman's office is [toll receive
communications and to remedy workplace problems, in a strictly confidential atmosphere."); cf.
State ex rel. Strothers v. Wertheim, 684 N.E.2d 1239, 1240 n.l (Ohio 1997) (describing an
ombudsman as an "office or person to which people may come with grievances" (quoting BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1086 (6th ed. 1990))).
128. See Kientzy, 133 F.R.D. at 572 ("It is important that.., employees have an opportunity to
make confidential statements and to receive confidential guidance, information, and aid to remedy
workplace problems to[] benefit themselves and possibly the nation.").
129. Seeid. at571.
130. See id. at 571,573.
131. Seeid. at571.
132. Id.
133. See Kientzy, 133 F.R.D. at 572. See generally UMC/Stamford, Inc. v. Allianz
Underwriters Ins. Co., 647 A.2d 182, 191 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994) ("Confidentiality is the
key component to settlement negotiations ....).
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34
communications to and from company officials and employees."'
The court therefore refused to permit the plaintiff to depose the
other employees about their discussions
ombudsman,'35 or to question
36
with the ombudsman.
Not all courts have been willing to interpret Rule 501 this
broadly.' In fact, the court in Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.'
specifically rejected the analysis in Kientzy. 39 In holding that discovery
to an employer's ombudsman was not
of employee
communications
prohibted
byRule
5 1 40,
prohibited by Rule 501 , the Carman court stated:

To justify the creation of a privilege, [the employer] must first
establish that society benefits in some significant way from the
particular brand of confidentiality.... Only then can a court decide

whether the advantages of the proposed privilege overcome the strong
presumption in favor of disclosure of all relevant information.""
In Folb v. Motion Picture Industry Pension & Health Plans, 42 a
federal district court in turn cited Carman43 in indicating that it would
not extend
the mediation privilege recognized
145
•
•
146 in Sheldone'" and other
formal
settlement
negotiations.
The Folb court reasoned
cases to less
134. Kientzy, 133 F.R.D. at 572.
135. See id. at 573; see also Garstang v. Superior Court of L.A. County, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 84, 87
(Ct. App. 1995) ("In our opinion, private institutions have a qualified privilege not to disclose
communications made before an ombudsman in an attempt to mediate an employee dispute.").
136. See Kientzy, 133 F.R.D. at 573. In Derderian v. Polaroid Corp., 121 F.R.D. 9 (D. Mass.
1988), the court concluded that statements obtained from other employees during a similar internal
investigation were not protected from discovery under Rule 408, because such statements are "not
'made in compromise negotiations,"' and the rule only applies to "[e]vidence of conduct or
statements made in compromise negotiations." Id. at 10, 13 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 408).
137. See generally Mem'l Hosp. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1061 (7th Cir. 1981) (asserting that
"in making the determination required under Rule 501," courts should bear in mind that "because
evidentiary privileges operate to exclude relevant evidence and thereby block the judicial factfinding function, they are not favored and, where recognized, must be narrowly construed").
138. 114 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1997).
139. See id. at 794. But cf Garstang, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 88 n.4 ("We find the Kientzy
reasoning useful ... in considering whether, and under what circumstances, a qualified privilege
should be extended to communications made before an ombudsman.").
140. See Carman, 114 F.3d at 794-95; see also Solorzano v. Shell Chem. Co., 83 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1481, 1483-84 (E.D. La. 2000) (finding merit in the contention that "no
ombudsman's privilege exists under federal common law").
141. Carman, 114 F.3d at 794. For a prior discussion of the Carman decision, see Corie Marty,
Recent Development, Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 275
(1997).
142. 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 1998), aff'd, 216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000).
143. See id. at 1174-75.
144. See Sheldone v. Pa. Tpk. Comm'n, 104 F. Supp. 2d 511, 512-18 (W.D. Pa. 2000).
145. See, e.g., Hays v. Equitex, Inc. (In re RDM Sports Group, Inc.), 277 B.R. 415, 425-31
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that the confidentiality of settlement evidence is generally protected
'4 7
"only by Rule 408's limitations on admissibility."'
The court explained:
[T]he mediation privilege.., applies only to information disclosed in
conjunction with mediation proceedings with a neutral. Any
interpretation of Rule 501 must be consistent with Rule 408. To protect
settlement communications not related to mediation would invade Rule
408's domain; only Congress is authorized to amend the scope of
protection afforded by Rule 408.141

Despite this analysis, interpreting Rule 501 to create a settlement
privilege is not necessarily inconsistent with Rule 408.149 Courts that
have rejected the notion that settlement evidence should be privileged
generally have done so on the ground that Rule 408's prohibition on
admissibility does not apply where settlement evidence is offered for a
purpose other than to prove liability for, or the invalidity or amount of, a
disputed claim. 150 Unless settlement evidence is discoverable, this
argument goes, the proponent of the discovery will be unable to
determine whether it is admissible for a permissible purpose.151

(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002); see also Salfen v. United States, No. 3:00-CV-0463-G, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17623, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2000) ("All proceedings in a mediation session are
confidential and privileged from discovery."). See generally Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68
F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (referring to the "federal common law mediation privilege
that might [be] emerging").
146. See Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1180. For a prior academic discussion of Folb, see Ryan D.
O'Dell, Case Note, Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164
(C.D. Cal. 1998), 1999 J. DIsp. RESOL. 203.
147. Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1180 (emphasis added); cf NAACP v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 612 F. Supp. 1143,'1146 (D.D.C. 1985) ("Although the intent of [Rule] 408 is to foster
settlement negotiations, the sole means used to effectuate that end is a limitation on the admission of
evidence produced during settlement negotiations for the purpose of proving liability at trial.").
148. Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1180; cf In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 148 F.3d 487, 493 (5th Cir.
1998) ("Because privileges are not lightly created, we will not infer one where Congress has not
clearly manifested an intent to create one.") (citation omitted).
149. See Centillion Data Sys., Inc., v. Ameritech Corp., 193 F.R.D. 550, 553 (S.D. Ind. 1999)
("[Sitrong federal policy supports the settlement of cases and [Rule] 408 does not exhaust the reach
of this policy.").
150. See United States v. Hays, 872 F.2d 582, 588-89 (5th Cir. 1989); Vulcan Hart Corp. (St.
Louis Div.) v. NLRB, 718 F.2d 269, 277 (8th Cir. 1983); Scott v. Goodman, 961 F. Supp. 424, 437
(E.D.N.Y. 1997).
151. See, e.g., Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Dep't of Justice, 576 F. Supp. 739, 749 (D.D.C. 1983);
see also Kristina M. Kerwin, Note, The Discoverabilityof Settlement and ADR Communications:
Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and Beyond, 12 REV. LITIG. 665, 669 (1993) ("[I]f parties were
unable to discover settlement information at all, they would have no way of knowing whether any of
the information was admissible under one of the exceptions.").
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However, Rule 408 merely "does not require the exclusion" of
settlement evidence offered for certain purposes.' It neither compels the
admission of such evidence'53 nor precludes any statute, court order, or
other rule from providing protection it does not afford 5 4 by, for example,
prohibiting the admission of settlement evidence for any purpose."'
Accordingly, interpreting Rule 501 to authorize the recognition of a
common law privilege applicable' to settlement evidence would not
appear to contravene Rule 408.156
In fact, the admission of settlement evidence for a purpose
permitted under Rule 408 is no less likely to deter settlements than the
admission of such evidence for a purpose prohibited by the rule.' 57
Thus, the recognition of a settlement privilege would actually further the58
public policy objective the rule was primarily intended to promote.
152. FEb. R. EVID. 408; cf Weir v:Fed. Ins. Co., 811 F.2d 1387, 1395 (10th Cir. 1987)
(observing that "Rule 408 does not prohibit the admission of evidence of... settlement to prove
something other than liability").
153. See, e.g., Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 32 F. Supp. 2d 162, 166 (D.N.J. 1998)
("Fed. R. Evid. 408 states that it 'does not require' the exclusion of evidence negativing a
contention of undue delay; it does not require its inclusion."); Santrayll v. Burrell, No. 91 Civ. 3166
(PKL), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 586, at *6-*7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 1998) ("The language of the rule is
clear: settlement agreements are not automatically excluded from evidence if they are introduced for
the limited purpose of showing the bias or prejudice of the witness. This does not mean that the
");see also Wallis v. Carco Carriage Corp., Nos. 95agreement automatically is admissible ....
7176 et al., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 25309, at *18 (10th Cir. Sept. 19, 1997) ("Rule 408 is merely an
exclusionary rule, not one providing for the admission of evidence.").
154. Cf. Avary v. Bank of Am., 74 S.W.3d 779, 798 (Tex. App. 2002) (discussing a state
statute providing "confidentiality protections ... broader than the exclusionary rule" contained in a
state counterpart to Rule 408).
155. See Gunter, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 166 ("Nothing in Fed. R. Evid. 408 precludes [another] rule
from prohibiting the admission for any purpose of statements made during settlement
negotiations."); Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust v. Fleming (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 197 B.R. 541,
546 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (discussing a court-approved reorganization plan that was
"significantly... broad[er] than Federal Rule of Evidence 408 in that it proscribe[d] admissibility
of voluntary settlement conference information 'without restriction by purpose'".) (citation omitted).
156. In Gunter, for example, the plaintiffs sought to introduce a written settlement evaluation
that had been prepared by the defendant in a separate action in which the plaintiffs were not parties.
See Gunter, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 163-65. Relying on a local court order providing for the
confidentiality of such evidence, the court not only held that the settlement evaluation was
inadmissible, but that it "should never have been disclosed -to plaintiffs." Id. at 163, 164-66.
Rejecting plaintiffs' contention that the confidentiality protection available under the order could be
no broader than that provided for in Rule 408, the court held that the fact that the order offered
protection not afforded by Rule 408 "does not mean that it contradicts that Rule." Id. at 164-66.
157. See Weir, 811 F.2d at 1395 ("Although Rule 408 does not prohibit the admission of
evidence of the circumstances surrounding a settlement to prove something other than liability ...
many of the same concerns about... deterrence to settlements exist regardless of the purpose for
which the evidence is offered."); see also Orth v. Emerson Elec. Co., White-Rogers Div., 980 F.2d
632, 639 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Weir).
158. See Manko v. United States, 87 F.3d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1996) ("The primary purpose of Rule
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Indeed, the existence of such a privilege would rectify a widely
perceived deficiency in the rule'59 that one court described in the
following terms:
If any comments about the dispute made during the negotiation process
were later ... to be used ... as permitted in Fed.R.Evid. 408, the

posturing of the parties in the negotiations could well reduce or
eliminate any likelihood of settlement, or even serious negotiation, for
the parties would be extremely cautious about advancing a settlement
proposal that might be used against them. Thus, they may never get
beyond their 'positions,' even if they both may genuinely want to settle
their dispute. "0
Another problem with the analysis in Folb is that Rule 408 applies
equally to settlement negotiations that take place in mediation16' and
those that occur under less formal circumstances. 162 Thus, the Folb
court's willingness to recognize a common law mediation privilege163 is
no less an invasion of Rule 408's "domain"'" 6 than would be65 the
extension of that privilege to other types of settlement negotiations. 1
408 is the 'promotion of the public policy favoring the compromise and settlement of disputes' that
would otherwise be discouraged with the admission of such evidence." (quoting FED. R. EVID. 408
advisory committee's note)); Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Hudson United Bank, 493 F. Supp. 434,
445 (D.N.J. 1980) ("[Tlhe underlying purpose of the rule ... is to encourage settlement."), rev'd on
other grounds, 653 F.2d 766 (3d Cir. 1981).
159. See, e.g., Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 770 F. Supp. 161, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(noting that although "complete confidentiality of settlements may promote [the rule's] goal," the
rule itself "is merely a rule of evidence, which promotes compromises in one limited way"); Charles
W. Ehrhardt, Confidentiality, Privilege and Rule 408: The Protection of Mediation Proceedings in
Federal Court, 60 LA. L. REV. 91, 124 (1999) ("Many argue that the extent of protection
provided.., by Rule 408 is insufficient."); Rambo, supra note 116, at 1064 (noting that "scholars
have ... argued that Evidence Rule 408 is inadequate to ensure confidentiality").
160. Doe v. Nebraska, 971 F. Supp. 1305, 1307 (D. Neb. 1997).
161. Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1173 (C.D.
Cal. 1998) ("[Ciourts, in appropriate circumstances, will accord mediation evidence Rule 408 and
public policy-based protection." (quoting Eric D. Green, A Heretical View of the Mediation
Privilege, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1, 32 (1986))), aff'd, 216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000);
Rambo, supra note 116, at 1058 ("Rule 408 should be, and has been, applied to ... evidence arising
out of mediations."). But cf In re Doe, 900 P.2d 1332, 1343 n.l 1 (Haw. Ct. App. 1995) ("Federal
Rules of Evidence (Fed.R.Evid.) Rule 408 does not explicitly apply to mediation proceedings.").
162. See Ehrhardt, supra note 159, at 124 ("Rule 408 ... applies to all mediation proceedings,
as it does to other compromise or settlement discussions."); cf Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., 68
F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1124 n. 19 (N.D. Cal. 1999) ("Protection for mediation communications ... might
be found in ... rules related to settlement negotiations or to offers of compromise or judgment.").
163. See Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1179-80 ("[T]his Court finds it is appropriate, in light of
reason and experience, to adopt a federal mediation privilege applicable to all communications
made in conjunction with a formal mediation.").
164. id. at 1180; cf. Doe, 971 F. Supp. at 1307 (noting that without a mediation privilege, Rule
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Indeed, the Folb court itself effectively acknowledged that absent
its adoption of a mediation privilege, negotiations occurring in
mediation would, like any other settlement negotiations, only be
protected by Rule 408's limitation on admissibility.' 66 Specifically, the
court stated that "Rule 408 only protects disputants from disclosure of
information to the trier of fact, not from discovery by a third party.
Consequently, without a federal mediation privilege under Rule 501,
information exchanged in a confidential mediation, like any other
information, is subject to the liberal discovery rules."' 67
More fundamentally, however, the fact that Rule 408 does not
create a discovery privilege' 61 simply does not preclude the recognition
of such a privilege under Rule 501.169 In fact, as originally proposed by
the Supreme Court, Rule 501 would have precluded the recognition of70
evidentiary privileges not provided for elsewhere in the federal rules
408 "would allow introduction of statements made during negotiations when offered for 'another
purpose' than proving 'liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount' (quoting FED.R.EvID.
408)).
165. See Ehrhardt, supra note 159.
An important issue is whether the analysis used to recognize a common law mediation
privilege under Rule 501 differs because of the presence of Rule 408, which generally
protects against the admission of statements made during settlement negations. No other
confidential communication protected under Rule 501 is also protected by an
exclusionary rule of evidence.
Id. at 119 (footnote omitted).
166. See Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1180; cf. Lawson v. Brown's Day Care Ctr., Inc., 776 A.2d
390, 392 n.2 (Vt. 2001) (noting that a state counterpart to Rule 408 "make[s] information disclosed
in mediation inadmissible, but not privileged"). This observation is generally applicable only in
federal question cases. See Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1122 (observing that "state law protections
might be stronger than the protections offered ... through any federal common law mediation
privilege"). In state court litigation, mediation negotiations are likely to be protected from discovery
by state statute. See Sheldone v. Pa. Tpk. Comm'n, 104 F. Supp. 2d 511, 515 (W.D. Pa. 2000). The
same is true in federal diversity cases. See Magnaleasing v. Staten Island Mall, 76 F.R.D. 559, 563
n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("In a diversity case, the scope of an evidentiary privilege is determined in
accordance with state law, both at trial and in discovery proceedings.").
167. Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1171; cf Ehrhardt, supra note 159, at 119-20 ("Rule 408 does not
go as far in extending the cloak of confidentiality as does a mediation privilege. For example, a
privilege shields the mediation process from discovery and does not permit privileged matter to be
used to impeach the credibility of a witness.").
168. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Am. Fundware, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1516, 1531 (D.
Colo. 1993).
169. See Santrayll v. Burrell, No. 91 Civ. 3166 (PKL), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 586, at *6-*7
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 1998) (observing that settlement evidence that is "not automatically excluded"
under Rule 408 "remains subject to scrutiny under ... other rules of evidence"); cf Olam, 68
F. Supp. 2d at 1120 n. 15 ("[lit would elevate form over substance to suggest that [Rule] 501 could
not be implicated by [the] invocation of [a statute] ... [that] does not in terms create a 'privilege'
(but merely promises and mandates confidentiality).").
170. In Baylor v. Mading-Dugan Drug Co., 57 F.R.D. 509 (N.D. Ill. 1972), the court indicated
that under Rule 501 as originally proposed by the Supreme Court, evidence was "not to be
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or, alternatively, in a federal statutory or constitutional provision."'
However, that version of the rule was rejected by Congress'7 2 in favor of
a common law approach that permits the judiciary to develop privileges
on a case-by-case basis. 173 This legislative history'7 4 suggests that Rule
408's failure to make settlement evidence privileged' 5 does not preclude
the recognition of a common law settlement privilege under Rule 501 .
Moreover, the fact that no common law privilege applicable to
settlement evidence existed at the time the federal evidence rules were
considered privileged" unless it was "defined as an exception" to the rule. Id. at 512; see In re
Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 437 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (citing the original version of Rule 501 for the
proposition that "only the privileges therein specified should be recognized in the absence of action
by the Supreme Court or Congress"); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 710 F. Supp. 999, 1011 (D.N.J.
1989) (observing that "the Advisory Committee which drafted the original Federal Rules of
Evidence did not look favorably upon privileges in general").
171. See In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1323 (D. Nev. 1983) ("Proposed Rule 501 provided
that no testimonial privilege would be recognized if it was not contained in the Rules themselves or
in an Act of Congress, or in the Constitution of the United States, and thus, no such privilege could
be utilized in any federal court."). Specifically, the proposed rule stated:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act
of Congress, and except as provided in these rules or in other rules adopted by the
Supreme Court, no person has a privilege to:
(1) Refuse to be a witness; or
(2) Refuse to disclose any matter; or
(3) Refuse to produce any object or writing; or
(4) Prevent another from being a witness or disclosing any matter or producing any
object or writing.
PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 501, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 230 (1973).
172. See Brink's, Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.2d 700, 708 (2d Cir. 1983).
173. See Ryan v. CIR, 568 F.2d 531, 543 (7th Cir. 1977) (en banc) ("The intention of Congress
in enacting Rule 501 was that 'recognition of a privilege based on a confidential relationship and
other privileges should be determined on a case-by-case basis."' (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1277, at
13 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7059)).
174. For a detailed discussion of Rule 501's legislative history, see Note, The Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence: Of Privileges and the Division of Rule-Making Power, 76 MICH. L.
REV. 1177, 1191-95 (1978).
175. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 723 F.2d
), rev'd on other grounds sub nor.
238, 275 (3d Cir. 1983) ("Rule 408 is not a privilege".
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); United States v. Am. Soc'y
of Composers, Authors & Publishers, No. 13-95 (WCC) (MHD), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4159, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1996) ("Rule 408 is not, by definition, the source of a privilege.").
176. One commentator has stated that because Congress "decided that the Federal Rules of
Evidence should not be used to establish or change the scope of privileges," it is "difficult to argue
that rule 408 creates a privilege." Brazil, supra note 6, at 992. However, because the version of Rule
501 that was rejected in favor of a common law approach to the development of the law of
privileges would have precluded the recognition of privileges not specifically provided for in other
federal rules or statutes, it is equally difficult to argue that Rule 408 precludes the judicial
recognition of a settlement privilege under Rule 501. See Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 455
N.E.2d 1203, 1205 n.3 (Mass. 1983) (discussing the impact of a similar rejection of a state court
counterpart to the unadopted version of Rule 501).
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enacted' 77 is no impediment to the judicial recognition of such a
privilege"' because the courts "are empowered to adopt new common
law privileges pursuant to [Rule 501], on a case by case basis."" 9 As one
court stated:
[T]his court does not view Congress' decision to enact Rule 501 as it
now stands ...

as an intendment that the federal common law of

privileges should be frozen as it existed at the time the Federal Rules
of Evidence took effect. Rather, Rule 501 is a mandate to the courts to
develop the federal common law of privileges as reason and
experience dictate. "0
Implicitly adopting this analysis, one federal court has indicated
that settlement evidence should be protected by a common law
privilege.' premised in part upon "the pro-settlement policy embodied in

177. See Weissman v. Fruchtman, No. 83 Civ. 8958 (PKL), 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18289, at
*62 n.23 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1986) (stating that "the 'settlement privilege' was not a privilege
recognized at common law"); Smith v. B & 0 R.R. Co., 473 F. Supp. 572, 585 (D. Md. 1979)
("Privileges generally recognized under federal law include those for marital communication, those
between professional and client, and the Fifth Amendment privilege from self-incrimination.");
Oliver v. Comm. for Re-election of the President, 66 F.R.D. 553, 556 (D.D.C. 1975) ("While offers
of settlement (and presumably also negotiations which led to such offers) are clearly not admissible
at trial for a number of public policy reasons, such negotiations do not fall within the confines of the
privileges recognized at common law.").
178. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 710 F. Supp. 999, 1004 (D.N.J. 1989), aff'd, 879 F.2d
861 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[T]he common law's failure to recognize [a] privilege is not determinative.");
see also Kennon v. Slipstreamer, Inc., 794 F.2d 1067, 1075 (5th Cir. 1986) (Thomberry, J.,
dissenting) ("Although commentators have advanced several rationales for the common law
predecessor to Rule 408, the Rule itself is rooted in the policy of promoting settlement by
privileging settlements and settlement negotiations.") (citations omitted).
179. Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522, 526 (N.D. Fla. 1994) (emphasis
added); see also In re GrandJury Subpoena, 710 F. Supp. at 1005 n.8 (discussing "Congress' desire
for an evolutionary development of the federal law of privileges, an evolution which is to occur by
the careful evaluation of asserted privileges in the context of concrete disputes").
180. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 710 F. Supp. at 1012; see also Smith v. Smith, 154 F.R.D.
661, 673 (N.D. Tex. 1994) ("Rule 501 does not 'freeze' the law of privilege, but expressly envisions
that the law will develop incrementally." (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47
(1980))). But cf. Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privilegesin FederalCourts: An Alternative
to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61, 121 (1973) ("There is a real danger,
reflected in the reported cases, that the [rule's] reference to 'common law principles' will be taken
to exclude automatically recognition of any claims of privilege not grounded in nineteenth century
common law opinions.") (footnote omitted).
181. See United States v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 532, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(suggesting that settlement evidence is "protected. from disclosure by a variety of statutory,
contractual and common law confidentiality provisions and privileges"); cf. Brazil, supra note 6, at
988 (suggesting that the courts may recognize "a 'privilege' for settlement communications
under.., federal common law").
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[Rule] 408. '' 82 This observation suggests that, when read in conjunction
with Rule 501, Rule 408 supports, rather than precludes, the recognition
of some form of privilege limiting the discoverability of settlement
evidence. 83
In short, Rule 501 contemplates the recognition of common law
privileges where assuring the confidentiality of a communication would
serve broad societal objectives. 8 4 Rule 408 in turn was "designed to
promote 'the public policy favoring the compromise and settlement of
disputes,""'85 and reflects recognition of the fact that this policy will be
furthered "more by maintaining the confidentiality of [settlement]
agreements than by disclosure."' 86 Thus, when read together, 87 the two
rules support the recognition of at least a qualified privilege'88 that would
"limit otherwise broad discovery parameters" where settlement evidence
is concerned.'89

182. Alex. Brown & Sons, 169 F.R.D. at 544 (citing Bottaro v. Hatton Assocs., 96 F.R.D. 158,
159-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)); see also Texaco, Inc. v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 805 F. Supp. 385,
389 (M.D. La. 1992) (discussing "a jurisprudential rule that compromise agreements are generally
regarded as privileged"); Cook v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 132 F.R.D. 548, 554 (E.D. Cal. 1990)
(asserting that "there is a well established privilege relating to settlement discussions"); United
States v. Reserve Mining Co., 412 F. Supp. 705, 712 (D. Minn.) (referring to "the privilege
surrounding offers of compromise"), aff'd and remanded, 543 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976).
183. See Brazil, supra note 6, at 990 ("A strong argument in favor of viewing rule 408 as
creating a privilege can be built from the principal purpose of this rule."); Lo Bosco v. Kure Eng'g
Ltd., 891 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (D.N.J. 1995) ("Where... the text of [Rule 408] does not provide a
clear answer to the problem at hand, the [courts] must be sensitive to the purpose of the
provision.").
184. See Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 458 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
185. Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 770 F. Supp. 161, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting
the FED. R. EvID. 408 advisory committee's note).
186. Centillion Data Sys., Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 193 F.R.D. 550, 553 (S.D. Ind. 1999);
Wendt v. Walden Univ., 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1542, 1543 (D. Minn. 1996) (observing
that "confidential settlements frequently benefit society").
187. See Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1180
(C.D. Cal. 1998) ("Any interpretation of Rule 501 must be.consistent with Rule 408."), aff d, 216
F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000).
188. See generally In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1158 (3d Cir. 1997) (Mansmann, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring to "the authority granted to the federal courts by
Congress under Rule 501 ... [to] recognize a limited privilege").
189. Pagano v. Oroville Hosp., 145 F.R.D. 683, 688 n.3 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
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C. Protecting Confidentiality Under the Discovery Rules

1. The View That Settlement Evidence is Subject to the
Liberal Discovery Rules
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b), permits the discovery of
"any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of
any party."''0 Relevance is defined broadly for the purpose' 9' of

encompassing information that may be inadmissible at trial, 92 but that is
nevertheless "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence."'

93

Thus, the fact that settlement evidence may be

irrelevant and inadmissible at trial under Rule 408194 does not necessarily
render it irrelevant for discovery purposes.195
Indeed, despite the potential policy arguments in favor of protecting
settlement information from discovery, '96 some courts have concluded
that the liberal discovery standards reflected in Rule 26(b) should apply
to settlement evidence in the same manner as they apply to other types
of evidence.' 97 In Bennett v. La Pere,'" for example, the parents of a
190. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
191. For purposes of admissibility at trial, by contrast, relevant evidence is defined as
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
FED. R. EVID. 401.
192. See Bums v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 304 n.8 ("Ultimate admissibility is
simply not the test for relevance of material to be discovered."), reh 'g denied, 485 F.2d 687 (5th
Cir. 1973); Bottaro v. Hatton Assocs., 96 F.R.D. 158, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) ("Relevance in [the
discovery] context is broader than that required for admissibility at trial.").
193. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Am. Fundware, Inc.,
831 F. Supp. 1516, 1531 (D. Colo. 1993) ("Information which may not be admissible at trial under
the rule is still discoverable so long as that information may lead to the discovery of other
admissible evidence."); City of Groton v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 84 F.R.D. 420, 422 (D. Conn.
1979) ("Relevancy, the touchstone of discovery, is defined in terms of the likelihood that evidence
useful to a party's case may be uncovered.").
194. See Lesal Interiors, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 153 F.R.D. 552, 561 (D.N.J. 1994)
(observing that "evidence of settlement negotiations is generally inadmissible under Fed.R.Evid.
408 as irrelevant and contrary to public policy").
195. See Mfg. Sys., Inc. v. Computer Tech., Inc., 99 F.R.D. 335, 336 (E.D. Wis. 1983)
(rejecting the proposition that "because the matters upon which [an individual] is to be deposed
pertain to settlement negotiations between the parties, they are inadmissible under Fed.R.Evid. 408
and therefore irrelevant for the purposes of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)").
196. See Brazil, supra note 6, at 990 ("A strong argument in favor of viewing rule 408 as
creating a privilege can be built from the principle purpose of this rule."); Kerwin, supra note 151,
at 676 (referring to "the very convincing policy argument that compromise communications should
be immune from discovery to encourage settlement").
197. See, e.g., Griffin v. Mashariki, No. 96 Civ. 6400 (DC), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19325, at

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

25

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 1
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 20:1l

brain-damaged child brought a negligence action against the child's
physicians and a hospital.' 99 After the physicians settled with the
plaintiffs, the hospital moved to compel production of the settlement
documents. 2°° Relying on Rule 408, 0' the plaintiffs opposed the motion
on the ground that compelled disclosure of such evidence would deter
future litigants from settling their disputes.2 °2
The court rejected the contention that the hospital was required to
make "some particularized showing of a likelihood that admissible
evidence will be generated by the dissemination of the ...settlement
agreement. ' 203 Asserting that the public policy concerns underlying Rule
408 are not implicated by the disclosure of information pertaining to
completed settlements, 2° the court concluded that requiring a nonsettling
party to make a heightened showing of need for the discovery
of such
25
information "place[s] the shoe on precisely the wrong foot.
Because it found that settlement evidence is not privileged,2°6 the
court held that the hospital instead was merely required to establish that
the information it was seeking met the broad standard of relevance under
Rule 26(b). °7 Once this "modest threshold" was crossed,0 8 the burden
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1997); Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 122 F.R.D. 447, 449 (1988),
modified in part, 768 F. Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
198. 112 F.R.D. 136 (D.R.I. 1986).
199. See id. at 137.
200. See id.
201. See id. at 139-40.
202. See id. at 138, 140.
203. Bennett, 112 F.R.D. at 139 (quoting Bottaro v. Hatton Assocs., 96 F.R.D. 158, 160
(E.D.N.Y.1982)).
204. The court stated:
Bottaro misconceives the public policy considerations which underlie Rule 408. Parties
will be discouraged from making offers in compromise if such offers can unimpededly
creep into evidence at trial; so Rule 408 creates a prophylaxis to guard against this
foreseeable evil. Parties can now freely make settlement proposals, knowing that if they
are spumed the propositions will not come back to haunt them before a jury. But, the
climate changes when a settlement is achieved. The fears which might inhibit the making
of offers in the absence of Rule 408 do not apply in such circumstances. No
discouragement attends discoverability anent completed compromises.
Id. at 140.
205. Id.
206. See id.
207. See id. The court noted that "the range of discovery under this provision is extremely
broad," and that "by its terms, Rule 26(b) does not condition the availability of discovery upon the
likely admissibility of the information sought." Bennett, 112 F.R.D. at 138.
208. Id. at 140. The court found the information at issue relevant "in several respects,"
including the fact that Rule 408 itself provides for certain limited exceptions to its general
prohibition on the admissibility of settlement evidence. Id. at 138-39. The court stated: "There is, of
course, no satisfactory way for the hospital to determine whether it can slip within the integument of
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shifted to the plaintiffs to establish good cause or a sound reason for
prohibiting disclosure.2 0 Finding that the plaintiffs had not satisfied this
burden,2 ° the court granted the hospital's motion to compel disclosure of
the settlement information. 2 '
2. The View That a Heightened Showing of Need Is a Prerequisite to
the Discovery of Settlement Evidence
The analysis in Bennett has been characterized as the judiciary's
most aggressive attack on the proposition that settlement evidence
should be at least presumptively privileged from discovery.2 2 However,
one of the nation's leading authorities on mediation, settlement and
discovery, Magistrate Judge 2Wayne D. Brazil," 3 is highly critical of the
14
view represented by Bennett.
As Judge Brazil notes,2 5 the Bennett court's refusal to require any
heightened showing of need for the discovery of settlement evidence
was based in large part upon its interpretation of Rule 408 as effectively
,,21 6
This interpretation
having no application to "completed compromises.
appears to have been premised upon the court's conclusion that only the
potential evidentiary use of a "spumed" -settlement offer by the party
who rejected it is likely to inhibit settlement negotiations.1 7

the Rule 408 exception unless it gains discovery access to the settlement documents." Id.
209. See id. at 140; see also Kerwin, supra note 151, at 672 (noting that the Bennett court
"plac[ed] the burden on the party resisting discovery").
210. See Bennett, 112 F.R.D. at 140.
211. See id. at 141.
212. See Brazil, supra note 6, at 997.
213. See Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 1127 (Cal. 2001)
(stating that Judge Brazil is "an expert in mediation law"); James J. Alfini & Catherine G. McCabe,
Mediating in the Shadow of the Courts: A Survey of the Emerging Case Law, 54 ARK. L. REV. 171,
177 n.27 (2001) (noting that Judge Brazil is "a widely published scholar in the dispute resolution
field"); A. Leo Levin & Michael E. Kunz, Thinking About Judgeships, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1627,
1646 (1995) (describing Judge Brazil as a "respected authorit[y]"); Edward F. Sherman,
Restructuring the Trial Processin the Age of Complex Litigation,63 TEX. L. REV. 721, 723 (1984)
(reviewing WAYNE D. BRAZIL ET AL., MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO

THE USE OF SPECIAL MASTERS (1983)) (referring to Judge Brazil's "expertise from research on civil
discovery and dispute resolution").
214. See Brazil, supra note 6, at 999 ("I strongly disagree with the... suggestion that it is
appropriate to decide whether negotiation material is discoverable simply by using the same
analysis that courts would use for any other nonprivileged matter.").
215. See id. at 997-99.
216. Bennett, 112 F.R.D. at 140; cf. Catullo v. Metzner, 834 F.2d 1075, 1079 (1st Cir. 1987)
(asserting that Rule 408 has only "limited" application to a completed settlement that fully resolves
a dispute).
217. Bennett, 112 F.R.D. at 140; cf. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. United States, 806 F.2d
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However, Rule 408 by its terms applies to actual settlements no less
than to attempts to settle disputed claims. 2 1 The Advisory Committee
Note to the rule similarly states that "[w]hile the rule is ordinarily
phrased in terms of offers of compromise, it is apparent that a similar
attitude must be taken with respect to completed compromises. ,2 9 Thus,
courts other than the one in Bennett have consistently recognized that
Rule 408 extends to completed settlements.2
Judge Brazil also correctly notes that the Bennett court's
assumption that Rule 408's objectives are fully served once a settlement
has been reached 22' reflects "an unrealistically narrow view of the several
different ways that fear of disclosure could impair the settlement
dynamic. 222 In fact, the need for confidentiality may be particularly
acute for an employer that must look beyond the context of its
negotiations with a particular employee and assess whether a settlement
would increase the likelihood that other employees will assert future
claims.223
By failing to recognize that the disclosure of information about
completed settlements may encourage other potential litigants to assert
claims,2 the analysis in Bennett and other comparable cases225 inhibits
1046, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("An unaccepted offer of settlement ordinarily is not admissible
evidence to show either the existence or amount of liability.").
218. See FED. R. EVID. 408 (stating rule's applicability to disputants' statements or conduct in
"compromising or attempting to compromise a claim"); Bums v. City of Des Peres, 534 F.2d 104,
112 n.9 (8th Cir. 1976) ("[Rule] 408 sets forth the general rule proscribing the admission of
compromises or offers to compromise except under limited circumstances.").
219. Young v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 539 F. Supp. 193, 194 n.1(E.D. Pa. 1982) (quoting
the FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note).
220. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 414, 423 n.10
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); see also Mich. State Highway Comm'n v. Copper Range R.R., 306 N.W.2d 384,
386 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (noting that the federal rule "appl[ies] to settlement agreements affecting
[a] disputed claim as well as offers of settlement"). See generally Windemuller Elec. Co. v. Blodgett
Mem'l Med. Ctr., 343 N.w.2d 223, 225 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (observing that "the federal
authorities have concluded that the rule governs the admissibility of a completed settlement").
221. See Brazil, supra note 6, at 999 (discussing Bennett).
222. Id. at 998.
223. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. EEOC, 435 F. Supp. 751, 759 (D.D.C. 1977) ("Knowledge
that anything 'said or done' by way of settlement ... will be disclosed to potential litigants is bound
to dissuade candor and even participation by employers in a negotiated settlement."), affid in part
and rev'd in part, 581 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1978); cf. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Hotel
Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 351 (3d Cir. 1986) (Garth, J., dissenting) ("The necessity for
confidentiality may be particularly acute.., where a defendant must look beyond the parameters of
a settlement with a single plaintiff and anticipate the impact of its settlement on innumerable future
cases.").
224. See Brazil, supra note 6, at 999 (noting the frequent concern of parties negotiating a
potential settlement with "parallel situations involving nonparties ... who might be encouraged to
file new claims" if information concerning the settlement was disclosed to them).
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parties' willingness to settle 26 and reinforces their natural instinct "to
play their cards as close to their chests as possible., 227 This in turn
obviously deters settlements, 228 and thus undermines the policies
underlying Rule 408.229
Judge Brazil asserts that Rule 408's policy of encouraging freedom
of communication will be seriously undermined if other courts follow
Bennett and routinely permit the discovery of settlement evidence.23
He thus maintains that even if the rule does not make settlement
information privileged, 231 that evidence should have "at least
225. See Vardon Golf Co. v. BBMG Golf Ltd., 156 F.R.D. 641, 650 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (referring
to cases that "follow Bennett").
226. See White v. Kenneth Warren & Son, Ltd., 203 F.R.D. 364, 369 (N.D. Ill. 2001)
("[F]uture parties may be deterred from entering into settlement agreements if settlement
agreements are later discoverable."); Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F.
Supp. 2d 1164, 1172 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ("Refusing to... protect confidential communications ...
creates an incentive for participants to ... refuse to participate at all."), affd, 216 F.3d 1082 (9th
Cir. 2000).
227. Brazil, supra note 6, at 999; cf. In re County of L.A., 223 F.3d 990, 993 n.2 (9th Cir.
2000) ("[Alllowing an inquiry into what transpired during settlement negotiations will surely chill
the candor of the parties .... ); Davis v. Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 195 F.R.D. 33, 38
(N.D. Okla. 2000) ("[D]ivulging... confidential [settlement] information ... undermine[s] the
willingness of future participants to speak candidly.").
228. See Lake Utopia Paper Ltd. v. Connelly Containers, Inc., 608 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir.
1979) (discussing the likely deterrence to settlement "[i]f participants cannot rely on the confidential
treatment of everything that transpires," and thus "feel constrained to conduct themselves in a
cautious, tight-lipped, non-committal manner more suitable to poker players in a high-stakes game
than to adversaries attempting to arrive at a just resolution of a civil dispute"). But see United States
v. Ky. Utils. Co., 124 F.R.D. 146, 153 (E.D. Ky. 1989) ("[S]ettlements will be entered into in most
cases whether or not confidentiality can be maintained. The parties might prefer to have
confidentiality, but this does not mean that they would not settle otherwise."), rev'd, 927 F.2d 252
(6th Cir. 1991).
229. See Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. United States, 806 F.2d 1046, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(noting that an interpretation of Rule 408 that would "discourage parties from discussing settlement
or making settlement offers" is inconsistent with the policy "favor[ing] settlement of litigation
which reduces the burden on courts and counsel and mitigates the antagonism and hostility that
protracted litigation ... may cause").
230. See Brazil, supra note 6, at 999 (observing that the policy underlying Rule 408 "would be
seriously jeopardized if courts routinely permitted discovery of communications made in settlement
discussions") (discussing Bennett); cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat, 904 S.W.2d 643, 649 (Tex. 1995)
(adopting the view that "routine discovery of settlement amounts" should not be permitted because
"revelation of confidential settlement amounts might have a chilling effect on parties' willingness to
settle at all").
231. Judge Brazil acknowledges that interpreting Rule 408 to create a settlement privilege
cannot be reconciled with the literal language of the rule. See Brazil, supra note 6, at 991, 995-96.
He nevertheless asserts that the rule is premised upon a "privilege rationale" that "focuses on the
importance of promoting settlement by encouraging 'freedom of communication with respect to
compromise,"' and that by providing for the admission (and thus, by implication, the discovery) of
settlement evidence for some purposes, the drafters "constructed a rule that is unfaithful to its own
rationale." Id. at 995-96.
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presumptive protection from both discovery and admissibility in most
circumstances. ' He states:
[I]f the law wants to encourage settlement by encouraging frank
negotiations, it is important to create an environment in which counsel
and parties can be fairly confident that what they say as they negotiate,
and the terms of any agreements they might reach, will not be used
against them later. Arguably, the law will fail to create such an
environment if settlement communications are discoverable simply on

a showing that "the information sought appears' 23reasonably
calculated
3

to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Judge Brazil is certainly not alone in this view." ' A number of
courts have also suggested that Rule 408 should generally be interpreted
to protect settlement evidence from discovery as a means of promoting
settlement. 35 As one such court has stated:
[T]he policy underlying Rule 408 is that settlements are to be
encouraged. The courts have generally sought to do so in the context of
discovery by applying a modest presumption against disclosure of
settlement negotiations in those circumstances in which disclosure
seems likely to chill parties' willingness to make the sort of disclosures
236
in settlement discussions that are necessary to achieve agreement.
Perhaps the most prominent example of this reasoning appears in
Bottaro v. Hatton Associates,'3 ' a case in which the court attempted "not
to formulate the basis of a privilege under Rule 408 but, rather, to
formulate a framework for establishing the relevance of settlement232. Id.at 996.
233. Id. at 990.
234. Another commentator made essentially the same point in the following terms:
Effective negotiation requires that the [parties] feel free to make candid remarks and to
engage in open discourse with their adversaries. To allow negotiations to become public
through free-wheeling discovery would discourage open discussion and thus interfere
with settlement. Public policy favors encouraging settlement .... Assurance of
confidentiality in negotiations ... is one means of encouraging settlement.
Lloyd C. Anderson, The Approval and Interpretation of Consent Decrees in Civil Rights Class
Action Litigation, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 613-14.
235. See Servants of Paraclete, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 866 F. Supp. 1560, 1576 (D.N.M.
1994) ("[M]any federal courts that have considered the discoverability of settlement negotiations or
agreements have explicitly or impliedly found that Rule 408 expresses the policy of protecting
settlement negotiations and agreements from unnecessary intrusions in order to encourage
settlement.").
236. SEC v. Thrasher, No. 92 Civ. 6987 (JFK), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2141, at *5-*6
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1996).
237. 96 F.R.D. 158 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
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related materials under Rule 26(b)(1). '23 In Bottaro, one of the
defendants entered into a confidential settlement with the plaintiffs.239
The remaining defendants then moved to compel disclosure of the terms
of the settlement agreement.2 40 The court denied the motion.2 4' The court
acknowledged that litigants are generally entitled to liberal discovery.242
However, it also noted that the terms of the settlement were unlikely to
be admissible at trial, 243 and asserted that the information at issue must
have some evidentiary value before the disclosure of otherwise
inadmissible 6vidence will be compelled.2"
In considering this issue, the court indicated that a mere "hope" that
information pertaining to settlement would lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence is insufficient.2 " The court stated:
Given the strong public policy of favoring settlements and the
congressional intent to further that policy by insulating the bargaining
table from unnecessary intrusions, we think the better rule is to require
some particularized showing of a likelihood that admissible evidence
will be generated
by the dissemination of the terms of a settlement
46
agreement.2

While Bottaro involved alleged violations of state and federal
securities laws,247 the analysis in that case has been applied in numerous
245
other contexts,2' including
employment disputes. 249 In Childers v.
238. Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Trinity Indus., 142 F.R.D. 80, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (characterizing
Bottaro); see also Kerwin, supra note 151, at 671 ("[R]ather than recognize the existence of a
settlement privilege, the [Bottaro] court simply rejected the idea that compromise information
should be discoverable per se and instead articulated a stricter discovery standard ... .
239. See Bottaro, 96 F.R.D. at 159.
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See id. at 159-60 (discussing Rule 408).
244. See Botaro,96 F.R.D. at 159.
245. Id. at 160.
246. Id. Presumably concluding that Rule 408 makes it unlikely that the disclosure of
settlement information will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, cf. Shipes v. BIC Corp.,
154 F.R.D. 301, 309 (M.D. Ga. 1994), the Bottaro court ultimately held that the defendants had not
made the showing necessary to obtain settlement information under the heightened discovery
standard it adopted. See Bottaro, 96 F.R.D. at 160; cf Mitchell v. Hutchings, 116 F.R.D. 481, 48384 (D. Utah 1987) ("If the evidence sought is ... inadmissible, and it does not appear that the
evidence sought will lead to evidence that is admissible, then the court can properly limit
discovery.").
247. See Bottaro,96 F.R.D. at 159.
248. See Young v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 169 F.R.D. 72, 76 (S.D. W. Va. 1996)
("When the requested discovery concerns a confidential settlement agreement, the majority of
courts considering the issue have required the requesting party to meet a heightened standard, in
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Slater,25 ° for example, the plaintiff in an action alleging employment
discrimination2 1 and retaliation 252 submitted interrogatories seeking
information pertaining to her employer's handling of other employees'
complaints of discrimination.253 In particular, the plaintiff sought to
discover whether the employer's stated reason for not settling her
claim was a policy it applied equally to all complainants."'
The employer argued that the public policy underlying Rule 408
protects settlement discussions from disclosure in order to encourage the
settlement of disputes.256 It asserted that permitting discovery into its
reasons for settling or refusing to settle claims asserted by other
employees would violate this policy 25 7 and therefore "discourage the very
25
thing Rule 408, and the judicial process, seeks to promote.""
Finding the employer's argument persuasive, the court refused to
grant the plaintiff the broad discovery she was requesting."' The court
instead permitted the plaintiff "only a limited intrusion into the
[employer's] settlement processes." 26° In reaching this result, the court
stated:

deference to Federal Rule of Evidence 408, and the public policy to encourage settlements and to
uphold confidentiality provisions."); Servants of Paraclete, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 866 F. Supp.
1560, 1576 (D.N.M. 1994) ("[T]he Bottaro court and... courts following its reasoning have held
that the party moving for discovery of settlement negotiations or agreements must make some
particularized showing that the information sought is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible
evidence.").
249. See, e.g., Butta-Brinkman v. FCA Int'l, Ltd., 164 F.R.D. 475, 476-77 (N.D. 111.
1995)
(relying on Bottaro and "the strong congressional policy favoring settlement" to "deny the
plaintiff's motion to compel the production of confidential settlement agreements reached with
other employees").
250. No. 97-853 (RMU/JMF), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11882 (D.D.C. May 15, 1998).
251. See id. at *1,*17.
252. See id. at *2, *17.
253. See id. at *15.
254. In order to avoid liability, an employer accused of unlawful discrimination and retaliation
is required to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for its employment
decision. See Turner v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 181 F. Supp. 2d 122, 133 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).
255. See Childers, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11882, at *15.
256. See id.
257. See id. Another court has specifically held that Rule 408 precludes the admission of
settlement evidence to prove that a litigant was "treated discriminatorily compared to the treatment
afforded [others]." Weissman v. Fruchtman, 83 Civ. 8958 (PKL), 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18289, at
*64 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1986).
258. Childers, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11882, at *15.
259. See id. at *17.
260. Id. Specifically, the employer was only required to identify comparable claims it had
settled or refused to settle, and disclose the race and gender of the claimants in those cases and
whether any of them had made previous allegations of discrimination. The employer was not
required to disclose its reasons for settling or refusing to settle other claims. See id. at * 17-* 18.
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This Court has specifically rejected finding a "settlement negotiation
privilege" emanating from Rule 408 in the context of protecting
documents from disclosure..,
in the discovery context.
However, as a matter of public policy.., plaintiff cannot gain
wholesale access into the [employer's] settlement processes through
discovery. Settlement discussions and settlement decisions occupy a
unique and protected place in our judicial system ....
Any invasion
into that process that might discourage negotiations or settlements
must be very carefully weighed against plaintiff's need to prove the
'* 261
allegations of her complaint.

The heightened discovery standard adopted in Bottaro262 and at least
implicitly applied in Childers effectively creates a rebuttable
presumption that settlement evidence is confidential.
Such a
presumption tends to encourage fuller and more frank settlement
discussions, 4 while nevertheless permitting the discovery of settlement
evidence in those cases in which the proponent of discovery can
overcome the presumption by establishing that the information at issue
is "truly relevant. 265
3. An "Intermediate" View: The Party Seeking Settlement Evidence
Merely Bears the Burden of Establishing the
Discoverability of Such Evidence
The significance of Bottaro's heightened discovery standard is
suggested by the observation in Doe v. Methacton School District 266 that

261. Id. at *15-*17 (citations omitted).
262. See Young v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 169 F.R.D. 72, 77 (S.D. W. Va. 1996)
(referring to "the Bottaro heightened standard"); Bank Brussels Lambert v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
93 Civ. 5298 (LMM) (RLE) et al., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2556, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1996)
(discussing "the heightened discovery standard articulated in Bottaro").
263. See, e.g., Riddell Sports Inc. v. Brooks, No. 92 Civ. 7851 (PKL), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
434, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 1995) ("[A]bsent a 'particularized showing' of their relation to
admissible evidence, documents concerning settlement are presumed irrelevant and need not be
produced." (citing Bottaro)); see also Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Echostar Communications
Corp., No. 98 Civ. 6738 (RMB) (MHD), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS'779, at *12-*13 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27,
2000) (discussing "the courts' recognition that the fact and substance of settlement negotiations may
be treated as at least presumptively confidential").
264. See Brazil, supra note 6, at 999-1000.
265. Shipes v. BIC Corp., 154 F.R.D. 301, 309 (M.D. Ga. 1994) (discussing Bottaro); see also
Kerwin, supra note 151, at 673 (observing that the Bottaro approach "allow[s] discovery of
[settlement] information under some circumstances"); Young, 169 F.R.D.'at 79 ("It is appropriate to
protect confidential settlement agreements, but not if such protection prevents necessary
discovery.").
266. 164 F.R.D. 175 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
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although the court in Bennett v. La Pere, which purported to reject the
Bottaro approach 26 1 "did not expressly require a particularized showing,
the court did, in fact, find such a showing before it ordered discovery. 269
The Doe court thus maintained that none of the courts considering the
present issue, including Bennett, have readily permitted the discovery of
settlement evidence, but all instead haveS•270
required "some heightened
showing of relevance or need" for the discovery.
171
However, this observation is not precisely accurate. The analysis
in Bottaro and its. progeny272 has actually been the subject of
considerable controversy, 27' and several courts have specifically refused
to follow it.114 Nevertheless, even some of those courts have adopted an
approach that shifts the burden of proof from the party opposing the
discovery to the party seeking settlement information, 7 ' but that does not
require any "particularized" or "heightened" showing in order to satisfy
that burden.276
In Vardon Golf Co. v. BBMG Golf Ltd.,27 for example, the court
joined Bottaro in placing the burden of proof on the proponent of
267. 112 F.R.D. 136 (D.R.I. 1986).
268. See Vardon Golf Co. v. BBMG Golf Ltd., 156 F.R.D. 641, 650 (N.D. I11.
1994) ("The
Bennett court rejected Bottaro ....); Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 122 F.R.D. 447,
450 (1988) (stating that the court in Bennett "went to great lengths to reject Bottaro"), modified in
part, 768 F. Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
269. Methacton Sch. Dist., 164 F.R.D. at 176.
270. Id. (citing, interalia, both Bennett and Bottaro).
271. See Servants of Paraclete, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 866 F. Supp. 1560 (D.N.M. 1994).
[At] least one federal court, while agreeing that the party moving for discovery should
bear the burden of showing Rule 26(b) relevance, has held that the movant need not
make a particularized showing,.and, some federal courts have either declined to modify
the Rule 26(b) standard as applied to discovery of settlement negotiations or agreements,
or have found it unnecessary to determine which standard to apply.
Id. at 1576 (citations omitted).
272. See id. (referring to "the Bottaro court and... courts following its reasoning").
273. See United States v. Barrier Indus., Inc., No. 95 Civ. 9114 (BSJ), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2244, at *6 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1997) ("To the extent that Bottaro ...requires a heightened
showing of relevance where settlement information is sought in discovery, courts have not
uniformly embraced the decision."); SEC v. Downe, 92 Civ. 4092, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 708, at
*17 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 1994) ("Courts have by no means uniformly embraced Bottaro.").
274. See, e.g., White v. Kenneth Warren & Son, Ltd., 203 F.R.D. 364, 367 (N.D. Ill. 2001);
Bennett v. La Pere, 112 F.R.D. 136, 139-40 (D.R.I. 1986).
275. See Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Felicetti, 148 F.R.D. 532, 534 (E.D.Pa. 1993) (citing
Bottaro).
276. See, e.g., Salgado v. Club Quarters, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 383 (LMM) (HBP), 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7047, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 1997) ("Although I agree with those authorities holding
that... no heightened showing need be made to justify discovery of a settlement agreement, a party
seeking production of a settlement agreement must, nevertheless, show relevance.") (citations
omitted).
277. 156 F.R.D. 641 (N.D. Ill.
1994).
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discovery, 27 s but concluded that the heightened discovery standard
adopted in Bottaro overstated the extent of the proponent's burden.279
Rather than adopt Bottaro's requirement of a particularized showing of
need,2 s° the Vardon Golf court held that a party may discover settlement
evidence by showing that the information at issue is admissible for one
of the purposes permitted under Rule 40821 or, alternatively, "by
articulating a plausible chain of inferences showing how discovery of the
item sought would lead to other admissible evidence. 2 s2
In Alcan International Ltd. v. S.A. Day Manufacturing Co. ,283
another court similarly refused to compel a representative of one of the
parties to provide deposition testimony pertaining to the parties' prior
settlement negotiations,2" despite acknowledging that Rule 408 does not
specifically limit the discoverability of evidence. 5 The court explained
that the party seeking the deposition had '"not shown that the evidence
sought by way of [the] deposition would be 'otherwise discoverable'
under the discovery rules," or "that the evidence sought would be
admissible for any other purpose. 2 s6
Requiring the party seeking settlement evidence to establish that the
information should be discoverable is not necessarily inconsistent with

278. See Servants of Paraclete, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 866 F. Supp. 1560, 1576 (D.N.M.
1994) (noting that the Vardon Golf court "agree[d] that the party moving for discovery should bear
the burden of showing Rule 26(b) relevance").
279. See Vardon Golf, 156 F.R.D. at 650; see also Young v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
169 F.R.D. 72, 76 (S.D. W.Va. 1996) ("In Vardon Golf Co ...the court concluded that the Bottaro
standard overstated the nature of the proponent's burden.").
280. See Servants of Paraclete, 866 F. Supp. at 1576 (stating that the Vardon Golf court "held
that the movant need not make a particularized showing"); cf. City of Wichita v. Aero Holdings,
Inc., 192 F.R.D. 300, 302 n.1(D. Kan. 2000) ("To the extent Vardon... suggests a higher burden is
placed on a party seeking to discover evidence related to settlement negotiations, the court rejects
the proposition.").
281. See Vardon Golf, 156 F.R.D. at 651. Rule 408 by its terms contemplates the admission of
settlement evidence for the purpose of "proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a
contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation." FED. R. EVID.
408. Moreover, "[t]his is an illustrative, not an exhaustive, list of the many exceptions to the Rule
408 prohibition." United States v. J.R. LaPointe & Sons, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 21, 23 (D. Me. 1996);
see also Lo Bosco v. Kure Eng'g Ltd., 891 F. Supp. 1035, 1039 (D.N.J. 1995) (characterizing the
"premise[] that the list is exclusive" as "so clearly false as to require no further comment").
282. Vardon Golf, 156 F.R.D. at 651; cf City of Wichita, 192 F.R.D. at 301-02 (observing that
"matter related to settlement negotiations, although barred by Fed.R.Evid. 408, may still be
discoverable under Rule 26 if the information sought is 'reasonably calculated' to lead to admissible
evidence").
283. 179 F.R.D. 403 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
284. See id. at 405-06.
285. See id. at 404.
286. Id. at 406.
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the pertinent discovery rules,"' as some courts have suggested,288 because
those rules must be read in conjunction with the policies underlying Rule
408.28' Thus, in the case of settlement evidence, courts should be
permitted to depart from the traditional presumption of discoverability 2 °
in recognition of the "privilege rationale" upon which the rule is
premised. 2 1 The Vardon Golf court reasoned that placing the burden of
proof on the proponent of discovery could also be justified on pragmatic
grounds:
The policies underlying exclusionary evidentiary rules have an equal if
not stronger basis in our policy as the policies favoring sweeping
discovery. The more logical approach to reconciling these divergent
policies follows the path of Bottaro. To place the burden of proving
that the evidence sought is not reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence on the opponent of discovery is to
ask that party to prove a negative. This is an unfair burden, as it would
require a party to refute all possible alternative uses of the
29 evidence,
possibly including some never imagined by the proponent. 1
Moreover, the court in Bennett itself acknowledged that the
discovery rules do not necessarily require the disclosure of settlement
evidence.293 Significantly, this is in contrast to information pertaining to
287. See Young v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 169 F.R.D. 72, 79 (S.D. W. Va. 1996)
("Rule 26(b) itself impose[s] upon the requesting party a greater burden to establish the relevancy,
and to gain discovery, of otherwise inadmissible non-privileged confidential settlement
documents."); cf. Tribune Co. v. Purcigliotti, No. 93 Civ. 7222 (LAP) (THK), 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8433, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1996) ("[S]ome courts have viewed the Bottaro standard as
reconcilable with the liberal discovery standards of Rule 26.").
288. See, e.g., Bennett v. La Pere, 112 F.R.D. 136, 139-40 (D.R.I. 1986).
289. See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339,
350 (3d Cir. 1986) (Garth, J., dissenting) ("[R]ecognition of the desirability of settlement has even
found its way into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); cf. First Nat'l Bank of Louisville v.
Lustig, No. 87-5488 et al., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12395, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 1989) (effectively
acknowledging that "the discovery rules should be applied to promote settlement"). But cf Cooper
v. Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389, 393 (E.D. Tenn. 1962) ("Compromise settlement is not the aim of the
discovery rules.").
290. See generally Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth. 641 A.2d 321, 328 (N.J. 1997) ("Although
relevance creates a presumption of discoverability, that presumption can be overcome by
demonstrating the applicability of an evidentiary privilege. A privilege reflects a societal judgment
that the need for confidentiality outweighs the need for disclosure.") (citations omitted).
291. Kennon v. Slipstreamer, Inc., 794 F.2d 1067, 1075-76 & n.I (5th Cir. 1986) (Thornberry,
J., dissenting); Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 32 F. Supp. 2d 162, 165 (D.N.J. 1998) (quoting
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:

EVIDENCE § 5312, at 272-73 (1980)); Brazil, supra note 6, at 995-96.

292. Vardon Golf Co. v. BBMG Golf Ltd., 156 F.R.D. 641,650 (N.D. I11.1994).
293. Bennett v. La Pere, 112 F.R.D. 136, 141 n.2 (D.R.I. 1986) ("[T]he Rules make no special
provision for the disclosure of settlement agreements.").
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insurance coverage,294 which like settlement evidence is generally
inadmissible,2 95 but the disclosure of which is specifically provided for in
the discovery rules.2 96 The absence of a similar provision for the
discovery of settlement evidence may provide a basis for interpreting the
rules as creating a presumption against the disclosure of such evidence.2 97
In addition, the rules specifically prohibit the discovery of other
evidence that, unlike settlement information, clearly is relevant 298 if that
evidence is privileged.2 99 In construing this discovery limitation,3°° courts
have generally concluded that the principles applicable to admissibility
at trial also determine whether evidence is privileged for purposes of
discovery.0 1 Under this analysis, evidence that would not be admissible
because of an evidentiary privilege is likewise not subject to discovery."'
As one court has explained:

294. Prior to 1970, the federal rules were silent on the discoverability of insurance information,
see Henderson v. Zur Indus., Inc., 131 F.R.D. 560, 562-63 (S.D. Ind. 1990), and the courts were
split on the issue. See Gangemi v. Moor, 268 F. Supp. 19, 20-21 (D. Del. 1967).
295. See FED. R. EvtD. 411; see also Henderson, 131 F.R.D. at 568 ("[Elvidence of conduct or
statements made in compromise is inadmissible under Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Moreover, under Rule 411, evidence of liability insurance is also not admissible.");
Kubista v. Romaine, 538 P.2d 812, 816 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (describing the prohibitions on
admissibility of "settlement negotiations or offers of compromise" and "the fact that the defendant
carries liability insurance" as "rules... designed not to discourage compromise and settlement").
296. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(D). The same is also now true in a number of state courts.
See Irvington-Moore v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 49, 53 (Ct. App. 1993) ("Specific
provisions for the discovery of insurance information are relatively recent developments in this and
other jurisdictions.").
297. Cf. Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F. Supp. 476, 480 (D.N.J. 1962) ("If disclosure ... is
thought to be desirable, the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be
amended... to allow such discovery." (interpreting the rules prior to their amendment to provide
for the disclosure of insurance information)). But see Bennett, 112 F.R.D. at 141 n.6 (finding "no
obstacle to ordering [the] production [of settlement agreements] when circumstances warrant").
298. Rule 408 is premised in part upon the theory that "evidence of settlement.., is irrelevant
to the issue of liability," although it may be relevant for other purposes. ESPN, Inc. v. Office of
Comm'r of Baseball, 76 F. Supp. 2d 383, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
299. See Bennett, 112 F.R.D. at 138, 140 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)); see also Int'l Tel. &
Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co. of Fla., 60 F.R.D. 177, 180 (M.D. Fla. 1973) ("Rule 26 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure allows discovery in civil cases 'regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.' . . . Accordingly, material
subject to ... privileges is not discoverable unless said material falls within some exception to the
rule.").
300. See S. Ry. Co. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 134 n.15 (5th Cir. 1968) (referring to "[t]he
limitation on discovery that it may extend only to matters 'not privileged').
301. See Smith v. B & 0 R.R. Co., 473 F. Supp. 572, 585 (D. Md. 1979); Handgards, Inc. v.
Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 60 F.R.D. at
180; cf. S. Ry. Co., 403 F.2d at 134 n.15 (stating that the discovery limitation "corresponds to the
rules of evidence").
302. See Smith, 473 F. Supp. at 585; cf. Frank W. Schaeffer, Inc. v. C. Garfield Mitchell
Agency, Inc., 612 N.E.2d 442, 446 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) ("[Wlherever a claim of privilege would
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The term "not privileged" as used in [the discovery rules] refers to a
"privilege" as that term is used in the law of evidence. A privilege thus
exists or not according to common acceptations in the law of evidence,
and immunity from production based on privilege is neither broader
nor narrower than it would be in the normal trial context. The
disclosure of information at the discovery stage of litigation which
would be inadmissible at trial due to the existence of a testimonial or
evidentiary privilege created by statute or common law is accordingly
not permitted, assuming the party intended to be protected asserts the
privilege at the appropriate time and satisfies his burden of establishing
its existence. 3°3

In other words, while the test for determining whether evidence is
relevant is broader for discovery purposes than it is for determining
whether evidence is admissible,3" there is no difference in the tests for
determining whether evidence is privileged.9 Thus, if settlement

evidence is considered presumptively privileged under Rule 408 or
501, ° precluding the discovery of such evidence where the presumption
has not been rebutted creates no more conflict with the federal discovery

rules than does the application of any other evidentiary privilege.0 7
One court applying this analysis in the settlement context 0 8 thus
assumed, without deciding, that Rule 408 applies to both the
be proper at the actual trial of the case, it is proper at the discovery stage.")..
303. Lincoln Am. Corp. v. Bryden, 375 F. Supp. 109, 111 (D. Kan. 1973) (citations omitted).
304. See White v. Kenneth Warren & Son, Ltd., 203 F.R.D. 364, 366 (N.D. Il. 2001) (citing
Eggleston v. Chi. Journeymen Plumbers Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d 890, 903 (7th Cir. 1981)).
305. See Peterson v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 112 F.R.D. 360 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
It is generally held that the concept of "privileged" as used in Rule 26(b) corresponds
with the concept of privilege as developed in the law of evidence. Thus, the scope of
privilege in discovery is neither broader nor narrower than the scope of privilege at trial,
and what is privileged under the law of evidence has been taken as a measure of that
which is privileged from discovery.
Id. at 362.
306. See supra Part IIA-B.
307. See Comercio E Industria Cont'l, S.A. v. Dresser Indus., 19 F.R.D. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
In every case where discovery is objected to on the grounds of privilege, the court is
confronted with a conflict of policies. Discovery is founded upon the policy that trial
should not be treated as a sporting event, but as a search for the truth. Therefore, if there
is any relevant information which may be of value in this search, it should be unearthed.
On the other hand, [a] privilege is based on the theory that although certain confidential
communications are relevant, their revelation will impair the social good .... Although
there are some who believe that the policy of discovery is so important that it should
even prevail over that of ... privilege, the framers of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have chosen to maintain the [concept of] privilege.
Id. at 514.
308. See, e.g., Small v. Hunt, 152 F.R.D. 509, 511 (E.D.N.C. 1994) ("Rule 26(b)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, limiting discovery to matter that is 'not privileged,' has been
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discoverability and the admissibility of settlement evidence.3°9
The practical difficulty this conclusion presents arises from the fact that
Rule 408 makes settlement evidence inadmissible for some purposes,
but not for others10 (i.e., settlement evidence is only "semiprivileged"). " Thus, even if Rule 408 does apply to discovery,3 2 that
fact does not resolve the question of whether settlement evidence is
discoverable in a particular case 3 3 because the evidence might fall within
an exception to the Rule 408 evidentiary "privilege." 3 4
In other words, given the unique structure of Rule 408,' 5
categorically prohibiting the discovery of settlement evidence cannot be
interpreted to mean that the same rules apply ... to discovery as apply at trial." (citing CHARLES A.
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2016 (1970))).
309. See id.; see also Florida v. Castellano, 460 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(suggesting that "the admissibility of [settlement] evidence could be equated with the privilege not
to disclose the evidence"); Dutton v. Guste, 387 So. 2d 630, 632 (La. Ct. App. 1980) ("[M]atters
that are privileged are not subject to discovery. A compromise settlement is generally regarded as
privileged .... ), rev'd on other grounds, 395 So. 2d 683 (La. 1981); Brazil, supra note 6, at 988
("[I]f communications made in connection with settlement are privileged, theywill fall outside the
scope of discovery, even if they are relevant."); cf. Derderian v. Polaroid Corp., 121 F.R.D. 9, 10
(D. Mass. 1988) (discussing the contention that "statements ... [that] are inadmissible pursuant to
Rule 408... should not be the subject of discovery").
310. See Centillion Data Sys., Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 193 F.R.D. 550,553 (S.D. Ind. 1999).
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 408, evidence of settlement offers and acceptances is
not admissible on the issues of liability or damages, but may be admissible for other
purposes "such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of
undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution."
Id. at 553 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 408).
311. See Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1171
(C.D. Cal. 1998) (discussing cases that "provide a semi-privilege to confidential settlement
agreements and negotiations"), aff d, 216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000).
312. See, e.g., Trebor Sportswear Co. v. Ltd. Stores, .Inc., 865 F.2d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 1989)
(Oakes, J., dissenting) (observing that Rule 408 "protects from discovery certain statements and
conduct presented in the course of compromise negotiations"); cf. Henderson v. Zurn Indus., Inc.,
131 F.R.D. 560, 568 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (asserting that evidence pertaining to a settlement evaluation
"would ordinarily not be discoverable because evidence of conduct or statements made in
compromise is inadmissible under Rule 408").
313. See Cook v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 132 F.R.D. 548, 553 (E.D. Cal. 1990)
("[D]iscovery rulings relating to the balancing of privileges against relevancy are, by their nature,
premised on myriad subtleties and concerns which frequently defy compartmentalization."); Trebor
Sportswear, 865 F.2d at 510 (noting that the evidentiary "bar" created by Rule 408 "is not an
absolute one").
314. See Dutton, 387 So. 2d at 632 ("Compromises are not privileged for all purposes or in all
cases. Certain exceptions exist to the general privilege."); Frank W. Schaeffer, Inc. v. C. Garfield
Mitchell Agency, Inc., 612 N.E.2d 442, 446 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) ("Because the same rules of
privilege govern the scope of discovery as govern admissibility at trial, a party may obtain pretrial
discovery of privileged materials.., if such materials fall within some exception to the
privilege ... " (citing Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Cal.
1976))).
315. See generally United States v. Skeddle, 176 F.R.D. 254, 257 (N.D. Ohio 1997)
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reconciled with the literal language of the rule.3' 6 Nevertheless, several
courts have relied on the policy of encouraging settlements underlying
the rule in fashioning a heightened standard governing the
discoverability of such evidence,3 7 concluding that the rule has
"tempered the liberal breadth of Rule 26(b) as applied to the discovery
of settlement negotiations and agreements." 3 8 Alternatively, the courts in
Vardon Golf and Alcan International effectively required the party
seeking discovery to establish that the information it was seeking was
"relevant" in the broad discovery sense for a nonprivilegedpurpose. t 9
Both of these approaches are more protective of the policies
underlying Rule 408 than one that would permit the routine discovery of
settlement evidence. 2 ° Nevertheless, some courts continue to follow
Bennet?2' and require that the party opposing the disclosure of settlement
information bear the burden of establishing that the information is not
discoverable.322 These differing views of the discoverability of settlement
evidence... serve to illustrate the dilemma employers face in attempting
(discussing "the structure of Rule 408," which "provides for certain situations when statements
made during compromise negotiations are admissible").
316. See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Dep't of Justice, 576 F. Supp. 739, 749 (D.D.C. 1983)
(construing Rule 408 to create a "broad discovery privilege" would be inconsistent with the fact that
the rule permits parties to offer settlement evidence "for a relevant purpose"); cf In re Gen. Motors
Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1124 n.20 (7th Cir. 1979) ("Inquiry into the
conduct of [settlement] negotiations is ...consistent with the letter and the spirit of Rule 408 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.").
317. See Serina v. Albertson's, Inc., 128 F.R.D. 290, 293 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
318. Servants of Paraclete, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 866 F. Supp. 1560, 1576 (D.N.M. 1994);
cf. Douglas v. Windham Superior Court, 597 A.2d 774, 776-77 (Vt. 1991) (suggesting that a state
counterpart to Rule 408 "creates an argument that ...settlement negotiation information should not
be disclosed because it is not relevant and is not 'reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence"') (citation omitted).
319. Cf. Dutton v. Guste, 387 So. 2d 630, 632-33 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (concluding that
although "[clompromises are not privileged for all purposes," courts should assume, in the absence
of a contrary showing, that settlement evidence is being "sought for purposes which fall under the
general privilege," and thus is "not subject to discovery"), rev'd on other grounds, 395 So. 2d 683
(La. 1981).
320. See, e.g., Lesal Interiors, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 153 F.R.D. 552, 562 (D.N.J.
1994) (concluding that the "most reasonable means" of reconciling the conflicting policies
underlying Rule 408 and the liberal discovery rules "is to require a greater, more 'particularized
showing' that the evidence sought is relevant and calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence") (citing Bottaro with approval).
321. See, e.g., White v. Kenneth Warren & Son, Ltd., 203 F.R.D. 364, 367 (N.D. IlI. 2001)
("This Court agrees with the Bennett court in rejecting the analysis of the court in Bottaro ....
").
322. See Vardon Golf Co. v. BBMG Ltd., 156 F.R.D. 641, 650 (N.D. Ill.
1994) ("Courts
placing the burden on the opponent of discovery to show that the evidence is not likely to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence follow Bennett ....
").
323. See Serina v. Albertson's, Inc., 128 F.R.D. 290, 293 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (referring to the
"conflicting standards" applied in Bennett and Bottaro); Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Fid. & Deposit Co.,

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol20/iss1/1

40

Moberly: The Discoverability Of Severance Agreements In Wrongful Discharge
2002]

Discoverabilityof Severance Agreements

to determine whether they can maintain the confidentiality of their
324
severance agreements.
D. Protecting Confidentialityby PrivateAgreement
In light of the uncertainty concerning the confidentiality of
settlement evidence under the pertinent procedural and evidentiary
rules,325 parties often attempt to protect their settlements from discovery
through the inclusion of specific confidentiality provisions in their
settlement agreements. 126 In one recent nonemployment case, Centillion
Data Systems, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp.,327 the court relied on such a
provision in prohibiting the discovery of settlement evidence,328 stating
that "the329 effectiveness of contracts is an interest the courts will
protect.,

Employers may find it particularly useful to include confidentiality
provisions in their
severance
agreements 330 because their
communications with employees are otherwise unlikely to be considered
122 F.R.D. 447, 450 (1988) ("Bottaro and Bennett provide conflicting views as to the showing
needed to compel discovery of settlement-related materials."), modified in part, 768 F. Supp. 115
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 713 A.2d 962, 967 n.4 (Md. 1998) ("The federal
courts examining the discoverability of settlement agreements are split on the requisite showing
needed to obtain discovery of these documents."); Kerwin, supra note 151, at 673 (observing that
"the Bottaro and Bennett cases differ significantly in their standards for discovery of settlement
communications").
324. See, e.g., Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Felicetti, 148 F.R.D. 532, 534 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(asserting that controlling precedent "provide[d] little guidance as to whether evidence of settlement
negotiations is subject to the heightened particularized showing or whether the information is
discoverable upon a mere showing of relevance").
325. See Vardon Golf Co., 156 F.R.D. at 650 ("A fundamental tension exists between the
liberal discovery provisions of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and the various exclusionary
rules found in the Federal Rules of Evidence."); Fid. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 148 F.R.D. at 534
("[T]he principles underlying Fed.R.Evid. 408 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 are in conflict.").
326. See, e.g., In re N.Y. County Data Entry Worker Prod. Liab. Litig., 616 N.Y.S.2d 424, 428
(Sup. Ct. 1994) (discussing a settlement that "could not have been achieved without an agreement
that the terms of the settlement, particularly the consideration paid, would not be revealed"); see
also U.S. EEOC v. Rush Prudential Health Plans, No. 97 C 3823, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4170, at
* 12 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31,
1998) ("Confidentiality clauses are common in settlement
agreements...."); Brazil, supra note 6, at 957 ("Counsel ...should consider using private
contractual agreements to strengthen the protection of the confidentiality of their settlement
communications.").
327. 193 F.R.D. 550 (S.D. Ind. 1999).
328. Although the court found some support for its holding in Rule 408, it recognized that the
rule only addresses the admissibility of evidence, and that "admissibility and discoverability are not
equivalent." Id. at 553 (quoting Bottaro v. Hatton Assocs., 96 F.R.D. 158, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)).
329. Id.
330. See 2 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 6, at 1932 ("Confidentiality clauses are
frequently of substantial importance to an employer.").
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privileged."' In Kalinauskas v. Wong, , for example ,the court stated
that "[t]he secrecy of settlement agreements and the contractual rights of
' in refusing to permit
the parties thereunder deserve court protection"333
discovery concerning an employer's confidential settlement of a
previous sexual harassment claim.334 Although the court also relied on
Rule 408,"' the employer had not argued that the settlement was
privileged under that rule,336but instead relied primarily on the language of
the settlement agreement.

A similar result was reached in Chase v. Weight,33 1 where the court
refused to compel the plaintiff in a wrongful termination case to disclose
33
the terms of his settlement with a former nonparty employer.
The plaintiff had agreed not to reveal the terms of the settlement "other
than as required by court order or legal counsel., .339 The court concluded
340
that the settlement, while not privileged in the evidentiary sense, was
3
4
nevertheless confidential, ' and that dissemination of its terms might
injure the former employer. 42

331. See United States v. Keeney, 11 F. Supp. 233, 235 (D.D.C. 1953) ("The law does not
recognize that communications between an employer and employee are privileged, even though
there may be a moral duty not to disclose such communications except when ordered by a
competent tribunal."), rev'd on other grounds, 218 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Smith v. B & 0 R.R.
Co., 473 F. Supp. 572, 585 (D. Md. 1979) (citing Keeney in rejecting the existence of "an employeremployee privilege"). But cf.Jessup v. Luther, 227 F.3d 993, 999 (7th Cir. 2000) (referring to "the
confidential nature of employer-employee relations").
332. 151 F.R.D. 363 (D. Nev. 1993).
333. Id. at 365.
334. See id. at 365, 367.
335. See id. at 365; see also supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
336. See Kalinauskas, 151 F.R.D. at 366; cf. Dimino v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 64 F. Supp. 2d
136, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) ("If defendants had made a stronger case as to the substance of the
settlement agreement, that agreement would have been more likely to gain protection under Rule
408.").
337. No. 87-570-FR, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3801 (D. Or. Apr. 26, 1988).
338. See id. at *1-*2, *4.
339. Id.at*2.
340. See id. at *6-*7; see also Salgado v. Club Quarters, Inc., 96 Civ. 383 (LMM) (HBP), 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7047, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 1997) (concluding that "no privilege attaches to
settlement agreements").
341. See Chase, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3801, at *4.Judge Brazil has observed that while
"some courts would distinguish between a 'privilege' and ...a promise of confidentiality," it is not
clear that there should be any "significance to this distinction" in the present context. Olam v. Cong.
Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1120 n.15 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (Brazil, J.).
342. See Chase, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3801, at *6; cf. Williams v. Compressor Eng'g Corp.,
704 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tex. App. 1986) (discussing "the right of an employer to insist that the
nondisclosure provisions of [its] contract with an employee be ...enforced").
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The impact of a contractual confidentiality provision was addressed
in more detail in Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Housing Services.34
In Hasbrouck, an employee asserting a wrongful termination claim
against her former employer 3 refused to disclose information pertaining
to her settlement of a previous claim against another former employer.345
The settling employer, a nonparty to the litigation,346 intervened for the
purpose of joining in the employee's request for an order precluding
discovery pertaining to the settlement. 3'7
The court acknowledged the liberal scope of discovery generally
available to the defendant employer.3 48 However, it also noted that the
breadth of the discovery rules creates a significant potential for abuse by
a party seeking discovery. 49 For that reason, the rules also provide for
the issuance of protective orders limiting or precluding particular
discovery upon a showing of good cause by the party opposing the
discovery.3 °
The court found good cause for protecting the confidentiality of the
settlement 35s based on the fact that the settlement agreement contained a
provision prohibiting the plaintiff from disclosing any information
related to the settlement. 352 The court noted that compelled disclosure of
the information at issue353 would deny the settling employer "the benefit,
confidentiality, for which it contracted." 3 4 Citing Kalinauskas,355 the
court concluded that this contractual right deserved its protection.356
343. 187 F.R.D. 453, affid, 190 F.R.D. 42 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
344. See id. at 454.
345. See id. at 453-54.
346. The plaintiff and the settling employer had resolved their dispute prior to the
commencement of litigation. See id. at 459 n.5.
347. See id. at 454.
348. See Hasbrouck, 187 F.R.D. at 454-55.
349. See id. at 455; cf Eggleston v. Chi. Journeymen Plumbers Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d
890, 903 (7th Cir. 1981) ("With a liberal interpretation of relevance comes the risk of abuse .... ").
350. See Hasbrouck, 187 F.R.D. at 455 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)); see also supra note 69
and accompanying text.
351. See Hasbrouck, 187 F.R.D. at458, 461-62.
352. See id. at 454; cf. Sharjah Inv. Co. (UK) v. P.C. Telemart, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 81, 83
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("[T]he court is not empowered to enforce confidentiality agreements that fail to
meet the good cause standard of rule 26(c)." (quoting Note,-Nonparty Access to Discovery
Materialsin the Federal Courts, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1085, 1090 (1981))).
353. Among other things, the defendant employer sought information pertaining to the terms of
the agreement, any payments that had been made under the agreement, the type of claim that had
been settled, and any witnesses to the alleged conduct that had given rise to the claim. See
Hasbrouck, 187 F.R.D. at 460.
354. Id. at 458. A settlement obviously may result in "the payment of substantial amounts of
money ... in reliance on the condition of secrecy." In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig., 92 F.R.D.
468, 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd sub nom. FDIC v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1982); see
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The court also indicated that the plaintiff herself had a legitimate
interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the settlement,357 if for no
other reason than to avoid potential liability for breach of the settlement
agreement.358 Rejecting the contention that it could somehow protect the
plaintiff from contractual liability for breaching the agreement's
confidentiality provision, 3 9 the court stated: "[Tihe language of the
agreement.., must control: a monetary penalty would ensue against
[the plaintiff] should she breach the confidentiality of the Agreement,
regardless of whether she voluntarily discloses the information sought or
36
it is obtained through judicial process.""
In holding that the discovery at issue would not be permitted,' 6 ' the
court suggested that it might have reached a different result if the
confidentiality provision contained an exception for "disclosure pursuant
to judicial process or order. 3 62 In doing so, the court contrasted its
holding with the result in Reiser v. West Co.,363 an earlier decision in
which a court had refused to protect settlement information from

also Dore, supra note 100, at 398 (observing that "many defendants pay a premium to secure the
confidentiality of their compromise").
355. See supra notes 41-50, 332-36 and accompanying text.
356. See Hasbrouck, 187 F.R.D. at 458.
357. See id.; see also Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 692 A.2d 5, 22 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1997) ("[Bloth parties have an interest in non-disclosure of settlement amounts because such
information may affect future settlement negotiations in other cases."), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 713 A.2d 962 (Md. 1998).
358. See Hasbrouck, 187 F.R.D. at 458; see also Capital Servs. of N.Y., Inc. v. E-Poxy Indus.,
Inc., 196 F.R.D. 11, 12 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that "violation of the confidentiality clause"
contained in a settlement agreement "gives rise to an independent cause of action"); Long v. Am.
Red Cross, 145 F.R.D. 658, 667 (S.D. Ohio 1993) ("If disclosure of the information would breach
some private agreement, the party in possession of that information may wish to seek a protective
order in order to be able to defend a claim that the confidentiality agreement was breached.").
359. See Hasbrouck, 187 F.R.D. at 456; see also N. Trust Co. v. Brentwood N. Nursing &
Rehab. Ctr., 588 N.E.2d 467, 470 (I11.Ct. App. 1992) ("A settlement agreement may not be altered
as to material terms without the consent of both parties, and a court may not alter an agreement on
its own accord.").
360. Hasbrouck, 187 F.R.D. at 456; cf Ingalls v. Superior Court, 573 P.2d 522, 524 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1977) ("There is nothing illegal about the entry into such an agreement such as would make it
void.., since, as between the parties involved, the agreement is valid and enforceable for its
purpose of preventing adverse publicity which might stem from the settlement of the previous
suit.").
361. See Hasbrouck, 187 F.R.D. at 461-62.
362. Id. at 462 n.9; cf. Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363, 367 (D. Nev. 1993) (holding that
contractual penalties for the disclosure of information pertaining to a settled employment claim did
not apply to "the disclosure of information for discovery purposes in furtherance of [another
employee's] case" because "the settlement agreement itself [made] exception for court ordered
release of information").
363. No. 88-0334, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3243 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 1988).
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discovery because the settlement agreement specifically permitted the
disclosure of certain otherwise confidential information.'
Reiser was a sex discrimination case in which the plaintiff deposed
another former employee who had previously settled a discrimination
claim against the same employer. 6 ' The deposition was terminated when
the employer asserted that the deponent's testimony was precluded by a
confidentiality provision contained in the settlement agreement.366
After the court indicated in a conference with the parties that a
review of the agreement would be necessary to resolve their discovery
dispute, the employer submitted the agreement for in camera
inspection3 6 ' and the parties proceeded to brief the employer's
confidentiality claim. 368 After reviewing the agreement, and without
discussing Rule 408,369 the court held that the deponent's proposed
testimony was not confidential,37 ° and that there was no basis for the
employer's objection to it.37 '
The court based its holding on the fact that the settlement
agreement itself permitted the disclosure of information that would
otherwise be confidential if the disclosure was made "pursuant to legal

364. See Hasbrouck, 187 F.R.D. at 456 (summarizing Reiser).
365. See Reiser, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3243, at *1. An interesting sidelight to the Reiser
litigation arose when the deponent subsequently sued the employer again, alleging that it had
unlawfully retaliated against her by threatening and harassing her in connection with her appearance
at the Reiser deposition. See Polay v. West Co., No. 88-9877, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5373, at * 1-*3
(E.D. Pa. May 4, 1990). The employer was ultimately awarded summary judgment on that claim.
See id. at *19-*26, *34-*36.
366. See Reiser, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3243, at *1. The agreement stated that "the various
claims raised by [the deponent], their general subject matter ....the reasons for the termination of
[her] employment ....and the terms of settlement and amount of settlement, all are confidential
information." Polay, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5373, at *20 n.10 (discussing the Reiser litigation).
367. See Reiser, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3243, at *2. The use of in camera review appears to be
relatively common in such situations. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 668 N.E.2d 825, 831 (Mass.
1996) ("Federal courts have approved the use of an in camera inquiry when a claim of privilege is
made and the information available to the judge does not, in the judge's estimation, afford adequate
verification of the witness's assertion of the privilege."). But cf. United States v. Solomon, 422 F.2d
1110, 1119 (7th Cir. 1970) (asserting that "courts have indicated general dissatisfaction with the use
of in camera inspection of confidential material").
368. See Reiser, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3243, at *2.
369. The court in Hasbrouck, by contrast, did cite Rule 408 in support of its holding. See
Hasbrouck, 187 F.R.D. at 458.
370. The court's opinion is silent with respect to whether the testimony at issue involved the
terms of settlement, or simply the facts that gave rise to the settled claim. See Reiser, 1988 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3243, at *1 (stating only that the dispute involved "the permissible scope of [the
deponent's] testimony"). As discussed previously, if it was merely the latter, the court's conclusion
that the information was not confidential is unremarkable. See supra notes 73-100 and
accompanying text.
371. See Reiser, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3243, at *2.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

45

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 1
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 20:1

process. 3 72 Noting that the plaintiff had subpoenaed the deponent to

testify,373 the court stated that "a subpoenaed witness testifies pursuant to
legal process. 374 As another court has stated:
"A subpoena is the medium for compelling the attendance of a witness,
and it is a process in the name of the court or judge, carrying with it a
command dignified by the sanction of the law." The only basis which
the witness[] would have for justifying a refusal to answer such a
court-ordered appearance would necessarily ... be a matter of
statutory or case law.375
Although the decision in Reiser was subsequently vacated,376 a
settling party undoubtedly can waive any confidentiality protection
afforded by contract or under Rule 408 , as effectively was found to
379
have occurred in that case.378 In Welch Foods, Inc. v. Packer,
for
example, another court similarly permitted discovery of settlement
evidence that otherwise may not have been discoverable under Rule
408," 0 because the settlement agreement itself provided that disclosures
could be made "if required by legal process."38' The court explained that
a contrary result would render the contractual provision permitting such
disclosures superfluous.8

372. Id. at *4. More specifically, the agreement stated that information deemed to be
confidential under the terms of the agreement "shall not be disclosed, discussed or otherwise
published by .[the deponent] ... except pursuant to legal process." Polay, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5373, at *20 n.10.
373. See Reiser, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3243, at *1.
374. Id. at *4; cf. Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. Titanium Metals Corp., 91 F.R.D. 84, 90
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) ("Disclosure pursuant to the discovery rule is disclosure 'authorized by
law .... '").
375. Ingalls v. Superior Court, 573 P.2d 522, 524 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (citation omitted).
376. See Polay, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5373, -at *24 (discussing Reiser). The decision to
vacate the ruling in Reiser appears to have been based on nonsubstantive grounds. See id. at *24
n.l 1.
377. See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Univ. of N.M., 936 F.2d 1131, 1134 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding that a
party had "waived any claim to Rule 408 protection"); Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 770
F. Supp. 161, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (acknowledging the view that "Rule 408 should be treated as a
species of privilege, which would permit waiver of the privilege by the parties"); cf. Ins. Co. of Pa.
v. Circle K Corp., No. H-95-0051, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8516, at *54-*56 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 24,
1997) (holding that the "privilege of confidentiality" applicable to settlement negotiations
conducted in mediation "can be waived").
378. See Reiser, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3243, at *3-*4.
379. No. 1:94 CV 814, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16158 (W.D. Mich. July 14, 1995).
380. See id. at*14.
381. Id.
382. See id.
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In fact, as originally promulgated,"', the proposed federal evidence
rules specifically stated that "[a] person upon whom these rules confer a
privilege against disclosure of a confidential matter waives the privilege
38
' 4
if he... consents to disclosure of any significant part of the matter.
While this provision was not adopted by Congress, it is nevertheless a
fair statement of the law on the subject,"' and effectively applies to any
claim of confidentiality that otherwise could be asserted with respect to
settlement evidence.3 7
The waiver analysis in Reiser and its progeny 8 thus serves to
illustrate the potential importance of the language of a severance
agreement, 389 as well as the uncertainty employers face when considering
the potential confidentiality of such agreements.39 In Marine Midland
Realty Credit Corp. v. LLMD of Michigan, Inc.,39 for example, the court
cited Reiser 92 in refusing to enjoin a party to a settlement agreement
383. For discussions of the controversy surrounding the approach to evidentiary privileges
reflected in the federal rules as they were originally proposed, see Krattenmaker, supra note 180;
Stephen Lloyd Tober, Comment, The Privilege Doctrine and the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1173 (1973).
384. PROPOSED FED.;R. EvID. 511, reprinted in 51 F.R.D. 315, 381 (1971); see also Victor E.
Schwartz, The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: An Introduction and Critique, 38 U. CIN. L.
REV. 449, 468 (1969) (noting that under the proposed rules, "[a]ll privileges [could] be waived by a
voluntary non-privileged disclosure, or consent to disclose, a significant part of the matter").
385. See Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.2d 700, 708 (2d Cir. 1983).
386. See United States v. Benford, 457 F. Supp. 589, 598 (E.D. Mich. 1978). As one federal
appellate court has noted:
[O]f the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court, Rules 501-13 were not adopted by
Congress although Rule 501 was amended by the Congress and became a substitute for
all of the court's promulgated privilege rules. Rule 501 thus left the law of privilege in
its then current posture, to be developed by the judiciary utilizing "the principles of the
common law. .. in the light of reason and experience .... Nevertheless, we can at least
look at the standards proposed to the Supreme Court by the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and adopted by the Court, as reflective of reason and
experience and "as a convenient starting point for examining questions of privilege."
Brink's Inc., 717 F.2d at 708 (citations omitted).
387. Cf. Doe v. City of N.Y., 15 F.3d 264, 269 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[A]n individual possessing a
right to confidentiality could waive that right if she failed to take the precaution of getting the [other
parties to the settlement] to agree to confidentiality.").
388. In addition to Hasbrouck, Reiser was cited with apparent approval in Marine Midland
Realty Credit Corp. v. LLMD of Mich., Inc., 821 F. Supp. 370, 372-73 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (discussed
infra notes 391-396 and accompanying text), and in Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363, 367 (D.
Nev. 1993) (discussed supra notes 41-50, 332-36 and accompanying text).
389. See generally 2 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 6, at 1927 ("Careful consideration
and drafting of the terms of the settlement agreement are critical for.., employers.").
390. See generally Brazil, supra note 6, at 1029 (referring to "the unpredictability of judicial
rulings in this area, and the unforeseeability of events that could result in disclosure... of
settlement communications").
391. 821 F. Supp. 370 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
392. See id. at 372.
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from disclosing the terms of the settlement in a subsequent judicial
proceeding,393 where the agreement itself permitted disclosure if
"required by law or by judicial or administrative process or
regulation. 394
The Marine Midland court explained the importance of the
language of the confidentiality provision in the following terms:
This Court recognizes that confidentiality is often essential to the
settlement of cases. The Court in no way minimizes the importance or
denies the legitimacy of confidentiality provisions. Yet, in the final
analysis, it is the language of the settlement agreement that governs.
The Court will not enjoin disclosure where it is not specifically
prohibited by the settlement agreement.9

The court also suggested that the outcome would have been
different if the exception to confidentiality had been more narrowly
3 96 However, at least in the employment context,
drafted.
this is an overly
formalistic and debatable proposition.
Employees negotiating the
terms of a severance agreement are likely to insist that any
confidentiality provision make exception for disclosures that occur in
response to compulsory legal process398 in order to minimize their
potential legal
exposure for a subsequent alleged breach of the
agreement.?99
In addition, the fact that a severance agreement does not expressly
permit disclosure in response to legal process might not be sufficient to
preclude discovery of the agreement,4" because a seemingly unqualified
393. See id. at 372-74.
394. Id. at 373.
395. Id.
396. See Marine Midland, 821 F. Supp. at 374 ("Had the parties wished to define more
narrowly the... exception to confidentiality ... , they could have done so.").
397. See Ridgeway v. Mont. High Sch. Ass'n, 858 F.2d 579, 587 (9th Cir. 1988) (criticizing
"formalistic arguments which do not fit the pattern of... settlement efforts").
398. See 2 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 6, at 1932 ("Confidentiality clauses should
define clearly the scope of the obligation, specifying any exceptions such as... disclosure in
response to a court order .... ).
399. See, e.g., Calvert v. Mehlville R-IX Sch. Dist., 44 S.W.3d 455, 458 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)
(reversing a judgment for breach of contract based upon the defendant's disclosure of a settlement
where the settlement agreement permitted disclosure as "required by law ... or in response to a
lawfully issued subpoena").
400. See, e.g., Long v. Am. Red Cross, 145 F.R.D. 658, 667 (S.D. Ohio 1993) ("[Rielevant,
unprivileged, and non-confidential information cannot be withheld in the face of a legitimate
discovery request simply because the party who possesses that information has agreed ... not to
disclose it."); see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1180 (6th Cir.
1983) ("[A] confidentiality agreement between the parties does not bind the court in any way.").
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confidentiality provision could be interpreted to contain an implicit
provision of this nature in any event.40 ' Thus, the specific language of the
confidentiality provision contained in a severance agreement, while
relevant, 40240may not be dispositive of the agreement's discoverability.4 3
III. CONCLUSION
As a matter of policy, the law favors the negotiation of severance
agreements as a means of settling or avoiding employment disputes, and
thereby reducing the amount of employment litigation.
It seems
equally clear that "on balance .... settlements are and will be
encouraged, in the run of cases, more by maintaining the confidentiality
of agreements than by disclosure. 40' 5 There are thus strong policy

401. See, e.g., Ingalls v. Superior Court, 573 P.2d 522, 523-24 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (holding
that a settlement agreement that prohibited the parties from "giv[ing] out any information regarding
the [settled] litigation" would not prohibit the disclosure of such information under "the very broad
language of Rule 26(b), which makes subject to discovery all material relevant to the subject matter
which is not privileged"); cf Homax Corp. v. Wagner Spray Tech Corp., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1830,
1831 (D. Minn. 1988) (holding that a settlement agreement that did not "expressly preclude
discovery" did not prohibit the disclosure of settlement evidence); Trinity Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Holum,
544 N.W.2d 148, 156 (N.D. 1996) ("[C]onfidentiality addresses the obligation to refrain from
disclosing information to third parties other than as part of legal process.") (emphasis added)
(quoting Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 11,at 192).
402. Severance agreements and other types of settlements are "treated as any other contract for
purposes of interpretation." United Commercial Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Paymaster Corp., 962 F.2d 853,
856 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, the language of the agreement, including that of any confidentiality
provision contained therein, provides the obvious starting point in interpreting the agreement. See
ITT Corp. v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 863, 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("In interpreting a settlement
agreement, 'as with any contract, the court looks first at the plain language of the agreement."')
(citation omitted).
403. See Tribune Co. v. Purcigliotti, No. 93 Civ. 7222 (LAP) (THK), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8433, at *8-*9 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1996) ("[Tlhe mere fact that the settling parties agreed to
maintain the confidentiality of their agreement cannot serve to shield it from discovery.");
Weissman v. Fruchtman, No. 83 Civ. 8958 (PKL), 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18289, at *62 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 31, 1986) ("The intention of the parties to the agreement, even if reflected in a confidentiality
clause ...
,is not controlling."); Lawson v. Brown's Day Care Ctr., Inc., 776 A.2d 390, 392 n.2 (Vt.
2001) ("The parties could not create an evidentiary privilege by agreement.").
404. See EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 744 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[P]ublic policy strongly
favors encouraging voluntary settlement of employment discrimination claims."); Lundy v.
Airtouch Communications, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 962, 970 (D. Ariz. 1999) ("Public policy favoring
settlement applies to an employee's claims of wrongful discharge.").
405. Centillion Data Sys., Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 193 F.R.D. 550, 553 (S.D. Ind. 1999); see
also Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 350 (3d
Cir. 1986) (Garth, J., dissenting) ("While the importance of settlement would seem to be selfevident, I believe it is equally obvious that confidentiality is often a key ingredient in a settlement
agreement - and that many settlements would not be reached if the secrecy of their terms could not
be safeguarded.").
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arguments for making severance agreements and •406
other forms of
settlement at least presumptively privileged from discovery.
However, there will be circumstances under which this presumption
of confidentiality can be overcome, 407 in which case a severance
agreement would be discoverable.4 0 8 Even if those situations are
relatively rare,4°9 an employer contemplating the use of a severance
agreement cannot safely assume that it will be able to maintain the
confidentiality of the agreement, 4'° nor can it afford to ignore the
potential ramifications of being compelled to disclose the agreement's
terms to other employees. 4 ' Unfortunately, this uncertainty will
inevitably reduce the number of severance offers that would otherwise
be extended to terminated employees as a means of resolving
43
employment disputes,4 12 to the ultimate detriment of all concerned.

406. See supra notes 157-60, 181-89, 213-65 and accompanying text.
407. See SEC v. Thrasher, No. 92 Civ. 6987 (JFK), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2141, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1996) ("[A] party may rebut the presumption by demonstrating a need for such
discovery, particularly in view of the fact that Rule 408 contemplates the trial use of settlement
statements for a variety of purposes.").
408. See Brazil, supra note 6, at 957 ("Despite the policy that inspires rule 408, there are many
circumstances in which ... settlement negotiations will not be protected from disclosure ....
").
409. See id. at 1001 ("[Clourts should permit rebuttal of this presumption only after a strong
showing that the competing interests clearly outweigh the interests and the policies favoring
confidentiality and that the competing interests cannot be satisfied in some other, less intrusive
manner.").
410. See id. at 966 (observing that parties "cannot safely assume that their [settlement]
communication[s] will be protected by rule 408"); Kerwin, supra note 15 1, at 685 ("[D]espite the
eloquent policy. arguments favoring confidentiality .... litigants must be prepared to reveal
informal, unassisted settlement information under almost any circumstances ....
").
411. See Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 692 A.2d 5, 22 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (noting
that the disclosure of settlement evidence "may affect future settlement negotiations in other
cases"), vacatedand remandedsub nom. Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 713 A.2d 962 (Md. 1998);
Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Collazo, 329 So. 2d 333, 338 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (discussing
"the possibility that public knowledge of ...settlement terms might affect other pending
litigation").
412. One court has stated that "employers would be reluctant to provide enhanced severance
benefits if waivers executed in exchange for those benefits could be struck down." Mahaffey v.
Amoco Corp., No. 93 C 4587, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13766, at *32 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 1995). In
many cases, this observation would be equally applicable where it is only the confidentiality
provision contained in the "waiver" that might be unenforceable. Cf. Anchorage Sch. Dist. v.
Anchorage Daily News, 779 P.2d 1191, 1193 (Alaska 1989) (noting that "some ...[parties] are
unwilling to settle unless the terms of settlement remain confidential, and ... a [party's] inability to
assure confidentiality may, therefore, adversely affect its ability to negotiate a settlement").
413. See generally Salowitz Org., Inc. v. Traditional Indus., Inc., 268 Cal. Rptr. 493, 498 (Ct.
App. 1990) (observing that "the prompt resolution of disputes benefits the... [parties] as well as
the judicial system").
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